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Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court:
Saving the Community from Itself
Suzanna Sherry*
INTRODUCTION
Questions concerning the proper role of courts in our representative democracy have intrigued constitutional theorists
throughout our nation's history. Central to many of these discussions are notions of restraint and activism, notions that focus primarily on the degree to which courts are willing to serve
as a countermajoritarian check on an overly zealous legislature.
Thus the Warren Court, at least with regard to individual
rights, is generally considered to have been an activist court,
protecting individual rights even when the constitutional basis
was disputable. The Burger Court, in contrast, is often viewed
as restrained, deferring to the other branches and interpreting
constitutional language narrowly.
To a certain extent, this characterization of the present
Court may be accurate. On closer examination, however, the
current Court's fidelity to the philosophy of judicial restraint is
open to serious question. This Article examines a somewhat
disturbing pattern that is emerging from the recent decisions of
the conservative bloc of the Court. These conservative justices,
who have consistently urged a doctrine of judicial restraint, are
at times exhibiting an activism both more subtle and more
transformative of the judicial enterprise than any activism
practiced by the Warren Court.
Part I of the Article shows that in defining the scope of the
issues the Court will decide, these justices in some cases are relying on constitutionally based principles of judicial restraint to
deny litigants access to the courts, while in other cases they are
implicitly renouncing these principles and reaching out to decide unnecessary, advisory issues. The Article further contends
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I would
like to thank Daniel A. Farber, Marcia R. Gelpe, Robert J. Levy, Jonathan R.
Macey, and Geoffrey R. Stone for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
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that through this selective activism and restraint the Court is
not only manipulating the issues it ultimately decides, but also
is doing so in a manner that furthers what Professor Geoffrey
Stone has called "aggressive majoritarianism":1 the systematic
elimination of the countermajoritarian protection granted by
the Constitution to individuals and politically underrepresented
groups, including ethnic minorities, women, and criminal
2
defendants.
Part II examines some possible reasons why the Court is
pursuing this majoritarian agenda and suggests that this pursuit
may stem from a newfound emphasis on community consensus
at the expense of individual autonomy. The Article then explains how this communitarian model differs from simple conservatism. In particular, the communitarian model better
explains decisions in which the Court narrowly interprets statutes enacted by the majority for the benefit of minorities, thus
protecting the majority from its perceived excessive concern for
the least fortunate members of society. The Article concludes
that the Court's doctrinal shift towards protecting community
values may signal the beginning of a fundamental change in the
Court's perception of its role in a democratic society.
I.

AGGRESSIVE MAJORITARIANISM: EXCISING THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PREMISE

A. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PREMISE
Since Marbury v. Madison,3 constitutional theorists have
been attempting to reconcile the countermajoritarian practice
of judicial review with the majoritarian structure of our representative democracy.4 Supreme Court invalidation of a state or
1. Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritarianisr."A Court
in Transition, 19 GA. L. REV. 15, 15 (1985).
2. This Article focuses primarily on decisions limiting the constitutional
and statutory rights of "discrete and insular" minorities as that phrase has
come to be understood, see authorities cited infra note 8. A secondary focus is
on the Court's derogation of individual rights that do not necessarily bear any
relation to membership in such a group.
The line separating these foci is not always sharp. As developed infra
notes 167-233 and accompanying text, whether the Court's aggressive majoritarianism in specific cases results in limiting the rights of minorities or limiting more generalized individual rights, the ultimate effect is the same:
increased protection of the judicially perceived interests of the community at
the expense of individuals.
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980) (defending noninterpretive judicial review); J. ELY, DEMOC-
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federal statute is countermajoritarian in two ways. Initially,
the Court itself is neither elected nor directly accountable to
any constituency. Further, when the Court invalidates a statute, it is overturning the decision of a popularly elected body; in
essence, it is enforcing its own will over that of the electorate.
Thus, if the guiding principle of our constitutional structure is
government by the consent of the governed, the practice of judicial review offends that structure.
Attempts to reconcile the process of judicial review with
pure majoritarianism are doomed to frustration, however, because the tension between majority rule and countermajoritarian protection of individuals and minorities is mandated by the Constitution itself.5 Although articles I and II of
the Constitution establish the principle of majority rule, the
Bill of Rights and other protective provisions withdraw from
that majoritarian process areas thought to be too dangerous to
entrust to the popular will. Justice Jackson recognized this
function of the Bill of Rights, stating: "The very purpose of a
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."' 6 A countermajoritarian premise thus exists in the Constitution itself, and the governmental
structure established by the Constitution "contains at least two
necessary principles-one of majority power, the other of ma'7
jority constraint."
RACY AN) DISTRUST (1980) (defending judicial review to police the representative political process); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) (judicial review is undemocratic, but necessary to protect minority rights); ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981) (symposium on function of judicial review); Judicial

Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981) (symposium on modern
theories of judicial review); JudicialReview and the Constitution-The Text
and Beyond; 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983) (symposium providing critique of

noninterpretive judicial review).
5. As Professor Lawrence Sager has noted, "our political tradition contains two components-a commitment to majority rule and a commitment to
individual rights-and ...
these two components are often in a state of conflict or tension." Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 417, 441 (1981).
6. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
7. Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
1099, 1117 (1977). For other suggestions that the Constitution contains a

countermajoritarian premise, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 112 (1970); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional
Law: JudicialReview and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049, 1088
(1979); Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
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Recognition of this countermajoritarian premise provides a
theoretical justification for judicial review. Some constitutional
theorists have focused on the countermajoritarian aspect of the
Constitution and have consequently advocated a policy of selective judicial activism. By affording individual and minority
rights special judicial protection, these commentators argue
that courts can compensate for the inequities inherent in a system of majority rule.8 Other theorists have emphasized the
majoritarian framework of the Constitution to defend a consistent policy of judicial restraint, despite the potentially unjust
effect of such a policy on individual and minority rights. 9
The current Court appears to be embarking on a third
ConstitutionalScholarshipand JudicialReview, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1231-32
(1984); Sager, supra note 5, at 441; see also Madison's notes of the FederalCon-

vention, May 31, reprintedin THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION
OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 84-86 (W. Solberg ed. 1958) (debate

over the merits of elite and popular rule in the legislature).
8. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 4, at 135-79; Sherry, Selective JudicialActivism in the Equal Protection Context"Democracy, Distrus and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 103-14 (1984); see also G.E. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A
PUBLIC LIFE 356-58 (1982) (suggesting that the Warren Court engaged in this
selective activism).
The Warren Court's expansion of the constitutional rights of minorities,
criminal defendants, and unconventional or unpopular dissidents exemplifies
this approach, emphasizing individual and minority rights, often at the expense of the majority. As explained in Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 1260, the
limitations the Constitution places on pure majoritarianism are all designed to
protect individual rights of one sort or another. Thus the Warren Court's activism can be viewed as a shift in emphasis toward the individual rights end of
the individualism-majoritarianism spectrum, a shift that is being reversed by
the present Court. See also Sager, supra note 5, at 443-45 (noting that the temporary suspension of majority rule, for example, by a commitment to equal
rights and worth of individuals, is necessary to maintain majoritarianism's
egalitarian appeal).
9. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-83 (1962);
Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1392 (1973); Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as An Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 894-97 (1983); Wallace,
The Jurisprudenceof JudicialRestrain 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-4, 11-16
(1981). Several scholars have attempted to defend the current Court's restrictive justiciability doctrines against charges of unprincipled decision making.
The attempts are ultimately unpersuasive not because the scholars' principles
fail, but because the Court, in the cases discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 76-166, fails to adhere to them. See, e.g., Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III- Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requiremen4
93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 315-21 (1979) (defending justiciability limits as necessary
to avoid "premature" decisions, a label fairly applied to the decisions discussed
in the text accompanying infra notes 76-166); Riggs & Proffitt, The Judicial
Philosophyof JusticeRehnquis4 16 AKRON L. REV. 555, 599 (1983) (contending
that "Justice Rehnquist responds to articulated principles of constitutional adjudication, rather than to an ideological preference").
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course, a course that is as yet theoretically unsupported.
Although putatively espousing a theory of judicial restraint
premised on constitutional arguments, the Court is engaging in
an activism that effectively restricts individual and minority
rights. This activism appears not only in the Court's substantive decisions, 10 but also in the Court's manipulation of the issues it chooses to decide. This procedural or jurisdictiondefining majoritarianism is particularly illustrative of the
Court's new approach and may signal a fundamental shift in
the Court's underlying agenda. 1
10. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 1, at 19-22. Professor Stone analyzes the
Court's "civil liberties" or "individual rights" cases: those involving claims
under the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. His analysis shows that between 1978 and 1982, the Court upheld such
constitutional claims an average of 39.4% of the time with the yearly percentage ranging from a high of 46% in 1979 to a low of 30% in 1982. In 1983, the
Court upheld constitutional claims only 19% of the time. Stone's statistics also
bear out the suggestion of a deliberate interventionism by some form of docket
manipulation. Between 1978 and 1982, the Court decided 54 or 55 "individual
rights" cases each year. In 1983, the Court decided 69 such cases. Id. at 17.
11. Professor Vincent Blasi has suggested that the activism of the current
Court lacks direction, primarily because the intellectual center of the Court is
also the political center. Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Cour4 in
THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198, 210-17 (V.
Blasi ed. 1983). This Article, analyzing primarily decisions rendered after
Blasi's article, suggests that the Burger Court's activism is beginning to take a
disturbing new direction. Blasi's article was written too shortly after Justice
O'Connor took office to evaluate the effect of her presence. It is therefore significant that she authored the majority opinion in three of the ten cases discussed in the text and joined the majority in each of the other cases in which
she participated. Of the conservative bloc who joined all the opinions, see infra note 17, Justice White also wrote three majority opinions (as well as the
concurrence in Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984), discussed infra note
119), Justice Powell wrote two, Justice Rehnquist one, and Chief Justice Burger no opinions. Justice Blackmun, whose voting pattern in these cases is
somewhat unpredictable, see infra note 17, wrote the majority opinion in City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). Thus Justice White,
identifed by Blasi as a centrist, see Blasi, supra, at 210, and Justice O'Connor,
whose brief tenure prevented Blasi from analyzing her position, may be creating the conservative leadership Blasi identified as missing from the Burger
Court. For articles supporting Blasi's thesis that the current Court is not dismantling Warren Court precedents wholesale, see e.g., Gunther, Foreword. In
Search of Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court-A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1972); Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was
It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So ProsecutionOriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices,in THE BURGER COURT. THE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Nichol, An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REV. 315, 318-19 (1984); Saltzburg, Forework
The Flow and Ebb of ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure in the Warren and
Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 153 (1980); ConstitutionalLaw Conference, 53
U.S.L.W. 2187, 2187-88 (Oct. 16, 1984) (remarks of Deputy Solicitor General
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It is almost a truism that all judges are activists in some areas. Justice Rehnquist imaginatively protects property rights
while decrying his colleagues' imaginative protection of privacy
rights.12 When determining both the substance and the sources
of constitutional rights, liberals and conservatives generally differ only in result, not methodology. Substantive activism, however, is ordinarily still constrained by jurisdictional notions.
Although a substantively activist court may, implicitly or explicitly, seek sources beyond the Constitution to justify its results, in so doing it does not transgress the fundamental nature
of the judicial role; even an activist court generally confines its
correction of perceived injustices to the cases and controversies
13
before it.
Paul Bator during opening address at United States Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference, Sept. 14-15, 1984). But see Arenella, Rethinking the
Functions of CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing
Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 193-97 (1983); Chase, The Burger Cour The Individual, and The CriminalProcess: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 518 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and ConstitutionalInterpretation,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1020, 1026-27 (1983); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist A
PreliminaryView, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 322-28 (1976); cf.Ginsberg, Inviting
JudicialActivism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV.
539, 546 (1981) ("calls for judicial intervention, for activist review of legislative
and executive decisions, depend less upon the challenger's 'liberal' or 'conservative' ideology, and more on the pragmatic question, whose ox is being
gored.").
13. Even Professor Alexander Bickel's critique of the Warren Court's expansion of the dominion of law suggested only that the activist Warren Court
made it easier for litigants to bring suit: he noted that the Court "ha[d] not
dispensed with the need for a lawsuit; it is still, unlike the President or the
Congress, a passive body that must wait for a litigant to move it to action." A.
BICKEL, supra note 7, at 107 (1970). This Article will suggest that the current
Court has gone beyond the passive judicial role, creating for itself not lawsuits,
but particular issues.
Moreover, the Warren Court activism, even when it had the effect of expanding the jurisdiction of the Court, is distinguishable on several significant
grounds. First, the Warren Court, unlike the present Court, was consistent in
its activism; it did not simultaneously issue opinions urging judicial restraint
and decisions abandoning principles of restraint. See generally id. at 13-16 (the
Warren Court adhered to a goal of defending property rights and the freedom
of individual enterprise). Second, the jurisdictional decisions of the Warren
Court were, by and large, explicit expansions of the power of federal courts to
reach substantive questions. Rather than deciding an otherwise nonjusticiable
substantive question in dicta without altering the jurisdictional rules-as the
present Court frequently does-the Warren Court simply made it easier for
litigants to petition the federal judiciary. Opening the federal courts to more
litigants is not equivalent to reaching questions unnecessary to a decision. Unlike the present Court, the Warren Court kept separate the spheres of justiciability and substance. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (relaxing
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A rather different sort of activism has lately been creeping
onto the Court. In the past few years, the Court has selectively
ignored canons of judicial restraint in defining the very scope of
its jurisdiction, engaging in procedural as well as substantive activism. It has often exceeded the boundaries of the cases
presented to it, reaching out to decide questions that were not
necessary to the resolution of the case. Consideration of some
of these unnecessary questions, moreover, offends constitutional principles of federalism or separation of powers, principles the Court uses in other cases to avoid redressing virtually
indisputable violations of constitutional and statutory rights.
What makes this particular type of activism so dangerous is its
potential for damaging the credibility of the judiciary by
politicizing it.14 What makes it so unprincipled is its internal
inconsistency. A court that decides property issues in favor of
right-seeking plaintiffs and privacy issues in favor of right-infringing defendants is at least candid; moreover, it opens itself
to public and academic criticism. This Court, however, hides
behind a cloak of nonjusticiability in some cases, defeating criticism on the merits, while in other cases it extends the sweep of
its robes, exercising jurisdiction it arguably does not have. 15
taxpayer standing requirements without reaching merits of establishment

clause claim); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (expanding availability of habeas corpus review without reaching the merits of petitioner's habeas
corpus petition); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (same); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962) (narrowing political question doctrine without reaching merits
of apportionment claim). But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (advisory opinion delineating procedural safeguards for custodial interrogation);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states
although appellant argued only for narrower grounds for reversal). Of course,
the current Court's surreptitious method is necessary in order to preserve the
impression of consistent judicial restraint. Finally, the Warren Court used its
activism on behalf of individual rights while the present Court uses it almost
exclusively against individual rights. The former use of activism is at least
theoretically justifiable. See authorities cited supra note 8.
Justice Rehnquist previously has been accused of reaching questions unnecessary to disposition of the case. See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 341-49.
Many of the opinions discussed by Professor Shapiro, however, were dissents;
the trend toward a solid majority of dicta dispensers seems to be a more recent
phenomenon. See supra note 11.
14. See Varat, Variable Justiciabilityand the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx.
L. REV. 273, 319 (1980). The same argument has been made in the context of
the Reagan administration's attempts to turn the Solicitor General's office into
a political tool. See Stewart & Wermiel, Family Feud: Reagan Conservatives
Assail Solicitor GeneralFor His Independence, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, at 1,
col. 1.
15. The difference between substantive activism and procedural or jurisdiction-defining activism is parallel to the difference Professor Lawrence
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This pattern of selective restraint and procedural activism
is starkly illustrated by a series of recent cases in the criminal
procedure and civil rights areas. Through an examination of
several decisions, the basic pattern emerges: principles of judicial restraint are used in some cases to avoid enforcing individual constitutional and statutory rights while procedural
activism is employed in other cases when opportunities for aggressively majoritarian decisions present themselves.
B.

RENOUNCING JUDICIAL ACTiviSM: SLAMMING THE
COURTHOUSE DOOR

The conservative members of the present Court have indicated quite clearly, both in their opinions and in their extra-judicial writings, that they espouse a doctrine of judicial restraint,
at least on jurisdiction or justiciability issues.1 6 In particular, in
a series of four cases denying plaintiffs standing to challenge
governmental actions alleged to infringe individual rights, the
same five justices' 7 outlined a doctrine of judicial restraint
Sager has identified between rights skepticism and court skepticism. See
Sager, supra note 5, at 419-20. Rights skepticism suggests judicial restraint
based on a view that the Constitution protects only a narrow range of individual rights, and is thus the rejection of substantive activism. Court skepticism
is grounded "on the view that primary responsibility for the identification and
enforcement of constitutional rights rests with the organs of government that
are more representative of the popular will-and possibly better qualified in
other institutional ways-than the courts." Id. This implicates the separation
of powers concerns that seem to underlie the current Court's professed adherence to principles of judicial restraint. Rejection of court skepticism opens the
way for the procedural or jurisdiction-defining activism described in the text.
16. In addition to the cases analyzed in this Article, see Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchman, 14 Am. U.L. REV. 1, 2, 22-23 (1964) (discussing alternatives to suppression of evidence from search and seizure); Denvir, supra note
12; Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976)
(advocating judicial restraint in deference to majority rule); Riggs & Proffitt,
supra note 9, at 590, 595-97; Jenkins, The Partisan:A Talk with Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 28; cf Blasi, supra note 11,
at 206 ("Only with regard to its interpretation of the technical doctrines and
statutes that demarcate the jurisdiction of the federal courts can the Burger
Court plausibly be said to have abided by the canons of judicial restraint.").
One author has suggested that while Justice Rehnquist cannot claim to be a
consistent practitioner of judicial restraint, he at least consistently applies his
own notion of federalism. Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1360-63 (1982). The problem with
this argument is that at least one of the cases discussed infra notes 76-166 and
accompanying text disregards state autonomy and is thus inconsistent with
Justice Rehnquist's advocacy of federalism as well as of restraint. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
17. This narrow majority consists of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. All five of these justices also joined
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grounded on the Constitution itself. In each of these cases the
majority rejected plausible constitutional and institutional arguments in favor of granting standing, and denied access to the
federal courts. Moreover, in each of the cases it is hard to imagine that even a politically conservative or philosophically passivist court reaching the merits would have been able to avoid
ruling for the plaintiffs. Each case involved a patent violation
of constitutional or other legal rights governed squarely by precedent politically difficult to overrule.' 8 These justices have
thus renounced the activist position taken by the Warren Court
and have chosen a considerably narrower role for the federal
courts in invalidating the actions of the popular branches. 19
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separationof Church and State, Inc.,20 the plaintiffs challenged
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's conveyance
of surplus federal property to Valley Forge Christian College,
an admittedly sectarian school in eastern Pennsylvania. The
plaintiffs alleged that the conveyance of the $577,500 parcel, at
no cost to Valley Forge, violated the establishment clause of the
the majority in each of the cases extending jurisdiction in other contexts, discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 76-166. Justices Brennan and
Marshall consistently dissented in both sets of cases, except Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). See infra
note 152. Justice Blackmun dissented from all the standing cases and joined
the majority opinion in all but two (United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
and Sea Clammers) of the cases extending jurisdiction. Justice Stevens dissented from all of the standing cases and all but one (United States v. Place) of
the extension cases. In addition, Justice Stevens has sharply criticized the majority for its resolution of unnecessary issues. See Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S.
Ct. 1257, 1259 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Grove City College v. Bell, 104
S. Ct. 1211, 1225-26 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1065-72 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also L.A. Daily J., Aug. 10,
1982, at 15, col. 3 (Justice Stevens's remark to ABA meeting that the Court
engaged in "unnecessary lawmaking").
18. Cf. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonmen 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 664 (1977) (contractions of standing "provid[e] an especially useful approach for the Court when a decision on the merits might overturn settled precedent.").
19. Others have accused the Burger Court of using standing requirements
to mask hostility to claims on the merits. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 18, at
663-64. Until very recently, however, a principled defense of stringent justiciability and standing requirements was possible, although more frequently
constructed by academics than by the Court itself. See authorities cited supra
note 9. The crucial change in the last few years is that the Court has maintained its posture of judicial restraint when doing so denies protection to individual rights, while simultaneously expanding its jurisdiction in order to
decrease the protection afforded individual rights by Congress and the states.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-166.
20. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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first amendment. 21 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority held that the plaintiffs, members of a nonprofit association
of taxpayers, lacked standing to challenge the conveyance. The
Court rejected the claim that the plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers under the Mast v. Cohen 22 doctrine and reversed the
Third Circuit's allowance of generalized "citizen standing."
Despite intimations in earlier cases that at least some
standing limitations had a prudential rather than a constitutional rationale, 23 Justice Rehnquist explicitly grounded his rejection of the plaintiffs' suit on article III. He began his opinion
21. The transfer of valuable property to a pervasively sectarian school almost certainly would have been held to violate the establishment clause had
the Court reached the merits. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-66
(1975) (invalidating various types of state aid to religious schools); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-88 (1971) (upholding building grants to sectarian
schools, only because buildings were to be used exclusively for secular educational purposes).
22. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). As Justice Brennan argued persuasively in dissent
in Valley Forge, it is not at all clear that Flastrequired a denial of standing to
these plaintiffs. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 505-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Before Valley Forge, some scholars had suggested that Flast should be interpreted to confer standing on taxpayers seeking to challenge any governmental
expenditure as violative of the establishment clause, whether or not it is specifically an exercise of the congressional power to tax and spend. See, e.g., Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 605, 632-33 (1968).
The crux of the Flast holding seems to be the emphasis on establishment
clause challenges. Alleged violations of the establishment clause present a
unique standing problem, insofar as that clause protects the rights of all citizens, but violation does not hurt one individual citizen more than any other.
Establishment clause violations create a shared individual injury. See generally Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. HEW, 619
F.2d 252, 264-66 (3d Cir. 1980); Monaghan, supra note 9, at 1369; Scalia, supra
note 9, at 892. The clause protects individual rights, unlike other clauses previously found insufficient to support citizen or taxpayer standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(incompatibility clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)
(statement of accounts clause); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)
(tenth amendment). Unlike most of the Bill of Rights provisions, however,
the establishment clause does not guarantee specific rights to any particular
citizen. Although alleged speech clause violations may be raised by any citizen
whose expression is suppressed, and fourth amendment violations by any citizen whose house is searched, the question of whose rights were violated by the
transfer of property to a religious institution remains a more problematic
issue.
23. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 92-94 & nn.6-7, 97 (1968). Flast is especially relevant, because the
Court there suggested that the limitations on taxpayer standing were in fact
prudential rather than constitutionally required. Flas4 392 U.S. at 94-101. The
majority opinion in Valley Forge acknowledged the prudential aspect of the
standing requirement, see 454 U.S. at 474-75, but chose instead to characterize
standing purely as an article III requirement. See ic at 475-76.
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with a six page excursion into the constitutional basis for the
standing requirement, 24 and the link between judicial restraint
and the command of the Constitution is illustrated by passage
after passage. 25
The square holding of Valley Forge is that the plaintiffs
lacked the requisite personal stake to satisfy the minimum requirements of article III: the Court professed itself "unwilling
to countenance such a departure from the limits on judicial
power contained in Art. III. '' 26 Thus, in addition to denying
standing to particular plaintiffs, Valley Forge clarified the constitutional limits on the Court's power. The majority used the
case to suggest a diminished role for the courts and a retreat
from active interference with the other branches of
government.
More recently, the Court elaborated its view that standing
requirements are constitutionally based, suggesting that they
are mandated by principles of separation of powers. In Allen v.
Wright,2" parents of black schoolchildren attending public
schools sought to require the Internal Revenue Service to develop effective procedures to enforce the IRS rule against tax
exemptions for private schools with racially discriminatory policies. The parents alleged two distinct injuries caused by the
agency's allowance of tax-exempt status to discriminatory
schools. The first allegation was that the plaintiffs were
harmed "directly by the mere fact of Government financial aid
to discriminatory private schools. ' 28 Additionally, they alleged
that the exemptions to discriminatory private schools inter24. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-76.
25. See, e.g., i&i at 471, where the Court stated:
The requirements of Art. III are not satisfied merely because a party
requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and
has couched that request for forms of relief historically associated
with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained
in the legal process. The judicial power of the United States defined
by Art. III is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts....
...Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for
the ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of "standing" would be quite unnecessary. But the "cases and controversies" language of Art. III forecloses
the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of

college debating forums.
I& at 471-73.
26. Id. at 490.
27. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).

28. I& at 3326.
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fered with federal and local officials' efforts to desegregate pub29
lic schools.
The conservative majority, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, assumed without deciding that the tax exemptions
were the equivalent of government discrimination 0 but found
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise either of the claimed
harms. The Court first rejected any claim based on "citizen
standing," or the right to have the government act in a constitutional manner.31 Justice O'Connor then generously characterized the plaintiffs' first injury as "a claim of stigmatic injury,
or denigration, suffered by all members of a racial group when
the Government discriminates on the basis of race. ' 32 This injury was held insufficient to create standing because the injury
did not result from discrimination against the plaintiffs personally; none of the children had applied to or been rejected by the
allegedly segregated private schools.3 3 Although the discussion
of this first injury is perhaps not very compassionate, it does lit34
tle violence to earlier precedent.
The Court's treatment of the plaintiffs' second claim-that
ineffective IRS enforcement interfered with effective integration of the children's public schools-is more problematic. The
Court's analysis of this issue confirmed that the doctrine of
standing is both grounded on and illuminated by separation of
powers principles. This analysis, the Court noted, is related to
the philosophy of judicial restraint, of the necessity for "constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government. '3 5 Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court held that
although the children's "diminished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated school" was a legally cognizable injury, the injury was "not fairly traceable to the Government
conduct [plaintiffs] challenge[d] as unlawful. '36 This conclusion
29. Id. at 3322.
30. Id. at 3326 n.20.
31. Id at 3326-27. This tracks the Valley Forge reasoning.
32. Id. at 3326.
33. Id.at 3327.
34. For analogous decisions holding that plaintiffs have suffered no individual harm, see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 222-23 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1972).
35. Wright, 104 S.Ct. at 3324 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
36. Id at 3328.
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is not surprising in light of such cases as Warth v. SeZdin 3 7 and
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization38
which suggest that when the harmful effect of governmental
action is partly dependent on the actions of independent third
parties, the plaintiffs have failed to show sufficient causal connection between their injury and the governmental action. 39
In Allen v. Wright, however, Justice O'Connor declined to
rely on this well-established doctrine of independent intervening actors as a bar to standing. Instead, she examined the chain
40
of causation in light of separation of powers considerations

and found the links too weak to fulfill the requirements of article III. The crux of her analysis was that federal courts are not
a proper forum for "general complaints about the way in which
government goes about its business."' 41 The limited role of the
judiciary, she continued, precludes it from adjudicating broad
challenges to executive programs. Thus, when plaintiffs "seek
a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive
37.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).

38. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The district court opinion and Supreme Court
briefs of both petitioners (treasury officials, and the founder of an exempt private school who had been permitted to intervene in the district court) relied
heavily on Eastern Kentucky as holding that third party intervention made
causation too speculative. See Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790, 794-95
(D.D.C. 1979); Brief for Petitioner Allen at 21, Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315
(1984); Brief for Federal Petitioners at 32-35, id.
39. In Warth, allegations that restrictive zoning ordinances prevented the
construction of low income housing were insufficient to confer standing on low
income families, because the dependence on available builders made causation
too speculative. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-07. In Eastern Kentucky, 426 U.S.
26 (1976), a challenge to the federal medical reimbursement structure, which
allegedly made it possible for private hospitals to refuse care to low income
patients, failed on similar grounds because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate with certainty the hospitals' response to a restructured federal program.
See Eastern Kentucky, 426 U.S. at 42-45.
40. See Wrigh4 104 S. Ct. at 3329-30. Although the text of the opinion is
rather vague about the connection between causation and separation of powers, Justice O'Connor stated in a footnote that "we rely on separation of powers principles to interpret the 'fairly traceable' component of the standing
requirement." I&i at 3330 n.26. Further, she noted that "[t]he idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury 'fairly can be traced to
the challenged action' of the IRS." Id, at 3329 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976)). Petitioner Allen's brief had made
more limited claims for principles of separation of powers: such principles
"underscorethe validity of this Court's refusal to recognize... citizen standing." Brief for Petitioner Allen at 26, Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984)
(emphasis added).
41. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3330.
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Branch to fulfill its legal duties," standing is lacking. 42 Instead
of merely denying standing under established precedent, the
majority used the opportunity to reiterate and elaborate the
constitutional basis for its philosophy of restraint.
The asserted link between the role of the judiciary and the
question of causation is somewhat puzzling. Justice O'Connor's
suggestion that the requested relief would unduly interfere
with the duties of the executive branch implies that such relief
could never be granted, to any plaintiff. Under this view, the
issue appears to be one of general justiciability rather than one
of standing. The Court has frequently noted, however, that
standing "focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated.'43 Moreover, even if, as the Court suggested, the
line between standing and other doctrines of justiciability is not
clearly demarcated, this means only that separation of powers
principles color the general question of standing. It is incomprehensible to assert, as Justice O'Connor explicitly did, that
the delineation of the proper role of the courts is uniquely relevant to the specific causation inquiry. 44
Allen v. Wright, moreover, was a singularly inappropriate
context for such an excursion into constitutional structure. Initially, the plaintiffs' challenge in Wright did not raise an ordinary complaint about the way in which the government goes
about its business. Protection of the rights of minorities against
the tyranny of the majority has widely been viewed as the most
justifiable exercise of the countermajoritarian power of judicial
review. 4 5 Even one of the staunchest defenders of strict stand42. Id.
43. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 99 (1968)) (emphasis added). Several commentators have suggested
that standing limitations in general stem not from separation of powers considerations, but from the necessity of allocating scarce judicial resources.
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 645, 670-83 (1973); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968) ('The
question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action
does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government."); Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 301, 306 (justiciability
concerns not based on separation of powers).
44. Wright 104 S. Ct. at 3330; see also supra note 40.
45. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 23-28; J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at
70-78; J. ELY, supra note 4, at 135-80; Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 301; Dworkin,
Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 135-36 (S.Hampshire ed.
1956).
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ing requirements as essential to separation of powers has suggested that
the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the even more
undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
46 should
function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.

The plaintiffs in Wright sought the aid of the judiciary precisely because racial prejudice had significantly narrowed their
access to the political branches. By resorting to constitutional
separation of powers arguments to justify its refusal to hear the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the Court thus reduces the legitimate role of the judiciary to a virtual nullity.
Additionally, there is a sharp contrast between the causal
flaw held to implicate separation of powers concerns in Wright
and the causal flaw actually identified and relied on by the
Court. Justice O'Connor's separation of powers rationale related to the weakness in the chain of causation. Her underlying
argument was that separation of powers principles dictated that
the respondents' injury was not "fairly traceable" to the challenged action because the "links in the chain of causation...
are far too weak." 47 In a different passage, however, she stated
that the required causation could be established "only if there
were enough racially discriminating private schools receiving
tax exemptions . . . for withdrawal of those exemptions to
'48
make an appreciable difference in public-school integration.
46. Scalia, supra note 9, at 894 (original emphasis altered). The sentiment
is not new. James Madison urged adoption of the Bill of Rights on the same
theory:
If [individual rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or the Executive;
they will naturally [be] led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of

rights.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
47. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3329.
48. Id at 3328. Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent that the plaintiffs
had in fact alleged that significant numbers of discriminatory private schools
were receiving tax exemptions. Id. at 3337-38 & n.5. Plaintiffs alleged generally that "many" racially segregated schools were tax-exempt. Complaint paras. 2, 21-22 (Joint Appendix at 17-18, 24-26), Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315
(1984). Plaintiffs then listed by name 26 tax-exempt schools and three schools
which had applied for exemptions located in their communities, characterizing
them as "schools which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments and which are located in or serve desegregating public school districts."
Complaint paras. 23, 24-48 (Joint Appendix at 26-38), id. These schools were
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This statement relates not to the chain of causation, but rather
to the significance of a direct causation. Even if there had been
many more private schools receiving tax exemptions, however,
the government's sufficiently "significant" contribution to the
plaintiff's ultimate injury still would have been tempered by
the actions of several independent entities (for example, the
private schools themselves and the parents of white children attending those schools), and thus the links still would be weak.
In the final analysis, even if separation of powers considerations constitute a policy limit on the length of an otherwise permissible chain of causation, such considerations should be
irrelevant to the question of the significance of the government's contribution to the harm.
Ultimately, the Court's reasoning in Allen v. Wright is
questionable. Its use of separation of powers principles to explain, rather than merely to justify, standing requirements is a
bit like using Kant to explain the Constitution.49 If any constitutional notion is more amorphous than the concept of standing, it is the concept of separation of powers. Moreover, the
inexact and unpersuasive way the Court employed the principles suggests either that the Court's philosophy of restraint
merely disguises hostility to the plaintiffs' claims on the merits
or that the Court is so committed to the constitutional rationale
for judicial restraint that it is willing to expound constitutional
doctrine uncritically and indiscriminately.5 0
In Los Angeles v. Lyons, 51 the same conservative majority
intertwined its denial of standing on article III "case or controversy" grounds with a discussion of principles of federalism.
Lyons, a black man, was stopped by two Los Angeles police officers for a traffic violation. His claim alleged that the officers,
without provocation, applied a chokehold which rendered him
alleged to have a total enrollment of up to 11,547 students. Plaintiffs identified

them as merely representative of "thousands of other" similar schools. Complaint paras. 38, 49 (Joint Appendix at 32, 38), i& As Justice Brennan noted,
the allegations of the complaint need not be proven on the merits in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss; moreover, the plaintiffs should have been given

an opportunity to amend their complaint. Id, at 3337-38 & nn.5-6.
49. Cf. D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 44-134 (1977) (applying the moral theories of John Rawls to constitutional questions).
50. Hostility to the merits is the less likely explanation, because Justice
O'Connor went out of her way to distinguish, however unpersuasively, earlier
cases reaffirming the federal judicial commitment to desegregation efforts.
See Wright 104 S. Ct. at 3330-32. In fact, at least one other recent case also
suggests that the Court is committed to a strict separation of powers doctrine.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983).
51. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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unconscious and damaged his larynx. He brought suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking both damages
and injunctive relief. He requested the court to enjoin the further use of chokeholds absent a risk of death or serious bodily
injury to the police officers or others. The district court, finding the chokehold to have been authorized by the Los Angeles
Police Department, issued a preliminary injunction 52 and the
court of appeals affirmed. 53 In an opinion authored by Justice
White, the Supreme Court reversed, holding both that Lyons
lacked standing to press claims for injunctive relief and that injunctive relief would be inappropriate even if he did have
54
standing.
The Court first declined to declare the case moot, even
though the city had issued a moratorium on the use of
chokeholds except under circumstances otherwise authorizing
the use of deadly force.5 5 The Court next addressed the claim
for injunctive relief under alternative analyses. In his first
analysis, Justice White did not dispute Lyons's standing to seek
damages. Instead, he separated the issue of standing to seek
damages from the issue of standing to seek injunctive relief and
found the latter to be lacking because Lyons had failed to establish a "real and immediate threat" that he would again be
subjected to an unlawful chokehold. 56 Under Justice White's
52.

The district court enjoined the use of chokeholds absent a threat of

death or serious bodily injury, and ordered an improved police training program and reporting requirements. See id. at 100. The preliminary injunction
never went into effect as a result of successive stays by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. See id. at 100 n.3.
53. Id. at 100.
54. Id. at 110-11.
55. Id. at 101. The reason given by the Court was that "the moratorium
by its terms is not permanent." Id.
56. Id. at 105-07 & nn.7-8. The Court suggested that Lyons would have
had standing had he alleged that chokeholds without provocation were authorized by city policy, which led to a dispute between the majority and the dissent
over the portent of Lyons's allegations. The majority contended that Lyons
never alleged that it was official policy to use chokeholds in the absence of any
provocation but only that official policy allowed the use of chokeholds in the
absence of threat of death or serious bodily injury. See id. at 105-06 & n.7.
The dissent aptly noted that the complaint alleged both that Lyons himself
was choked without provocation (confirmed by the district court findings) and
that he was choked pursuant to an official policy:
[The complaint] fails to allege in haec verba that the city's policy authorizes the choking of suspects without provocation. I am aware of
no case decided since the abolition of the old common-law forms
of action, and the Court cites none, that in any way supports this
crabbed construction of the complaint. A federal court is capable of
concluding for itself that two plus two equals four.
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alternative analysis, it was assumed that Lyons's damages suit
afforded him standing to seek an injunction. The Court found
nevertheless that equitable relief was unavailable because Lyons had made no showing of irreparable injury. As under the
first analysis, the lack of any real and immediate threat of fu57
ture injury was dispositive.
The Court's separation of the standing question into two
independent questions under the first analysis is peculiar. Initially, the question of standing focuses on the party seeking re58
lief, not on the issues that party wishes to have adjudicated.
There was no question that Lyons had the personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy required to get him into federal
court, because the majority acknowledged his standing to pursue his damages claim. By fragmenting the general standing inquiry into separate inquiries for each of the plaintiff's claims,
the Court created for itself a before-the-fact "line item veto"
power that may undercut the utility of the broad discretion
59
courts have to fashion appropriate equitable relief.
There is another problem with dividing the standing inquiry. The court of appeals had held that Lyons had standing
to seek injunctive relief "'if only for a period of a few seconds'
while the stranglehold was being applied to him" and that the
claim avoided mootness because it was "'capable of repetition
[yet evaded] review.' "60 The Court rejected this argument, on
the ground that Lyons's live damage suit ensured that his claim
would not evade review. Thus, for the purpose of determining
Lyons's standing, the Court separated the damage claim from
the injunctive claim, but for the purpose of determining moot61
ness, the Court considered the two claims together.
Because the Court held that Lyons did not have standing to
Id, at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 111.
58. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 99 (1968)).
59. Cf Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 131 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that "there are dangers inherent in any doctrine that permits a
court to foreclose any consideration of [a] remedy by ruling on the pleadings
that the plaintiff lacks standing to seek it.").
60. See Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
61. The Court also suggested that it was unlikely that Lyons himself
would again be subjected to a chokehold and thus that the claim was not "capable of repetition." Id. Although this is a reasonable if unpersuasive argument in the context of standing, it is absurd in this context in light of such
cases as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973), holding that a pregnancy coming
to term does not moot a case concerning abortion.
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pursue his injunctive claim, one can only wonder why the
Court held alternatively that even if Lyons did have standing to
pursue the claim, equitable relief would not be available. The
answer might lie in Justice White's exposition on the federalism concerns that "counsel[ed] restraint" 62 against such relief.
After noting that suits brought under section 1983 are exempt
from the ban against issuing injunctions directed at state court
proceedings, he argued that this exemption does "not displace
the normal principles of equity, comity, and federalism that
should inform the judgment of federal courts when asked to
oversee state law enforcement authorities." 63 These concerns
were underscored in Justice White's concluding paragraph,
where he stated that
the state courts need not impose the same standing or remedial requirements that govern federal court proceedings. The individual
States may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis. But this is
not the role of a federal court6 4absent far more justification than Lyons has proffered in this case.

Because the question of the availability of equitable relief was
not even raised in the petition for certiorari, 65 the most logical
reason for this discussion is that the Court was eager to expound upon the federalist principles that underly its notions of
judicial restraint.
In PennhurstState School & Hospital v. Halderman,66 the
Court also relied on principles of federalism to bar a suit by
plaintiffs seeking vindication for undisputed violations of individual rights. Residents and potential residents of Pennhurst, a
state institution for the mentally handicapped, brought suit
against various state officials, seeking to enjoin institutional
conditions that violated state and federal law. After an initial
skirmish over the scope of the rights established by federal law,
the lower courts found numerous violations of state law and ordered injunctive relief, including the immediate removal of residents from Pennhurst and the appointment of a special master
to supervise the orders of the court. 67 The Supreme Court re62. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983).
63. Id64. Id at 113.
65. See id at 132 n.22, 134 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
67. The district court initially granted the injunction on the basis of violations of the due process clause, the eighth amendment, the equal protection
clause, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), and § 201
of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA.
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versed, holding that the eleventh amendment prohibited federal courts from granting injunctive relief ordering state
officials to conform their conduct to state law.
The Court's central argument revolved around the fine distinctions drawn in Ex parte Young 68 between suits against a
state and suits against officials of the state and in Edelman v.
Jordan69 between prospective equitable relief and retrospective
monetary relief. Had the lower court concluded that conditions
at Pennhurst violated federal law as well as state law, precedent arguably would have compelled the conclusion that injunctive relief was appropriate. 70 In Pennhurst,state officials,
and not the state itself, were named as defendants, satisfying
the Ex parte Young requirement, and only prospective equitable relief was sought, satisfying the Edelman v. Jordan requirement. The Supreme Court held, however, that the Young
"exception" to the eleventh amendment foreclosure of suits
against a state, was a "fiction" accepted as necessary to reconcile the competing interests of state sovereignty and the vindication of federal rights. 71 When the right at issue is a state
right rather than a federal right such a reconciliation is unnecessary, and respect for state sovereignty compels the federal
court to refrain from "instruct[ing] state officials on how to
'72
conform their conduct to state law."
In so holding the Court essentially used principles of federalism to eviscerate the protections accorded by a majority of
Pennsylvanians to an identifiable minority of their less fortunate citizens. Moreover, it did so under dubious circumstances.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1985). See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314-25 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
court of appeals affirmed, grounding plaintiffs' right to rehabilitation in the
least restrictive environment solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, (DDABRA), 42
U.S.C. § 6010 (1982) (recodified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6009 (West Supp. 1985)). See
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 95-100, 104-07 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DDABRA
created no substantive rights, and remanded for consideration of the other bases for the remedial order. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981). The court of appeals on remand reaffirmed the propriety
of the remedial order, basing its decision on state law violations and not reaching the constitutional or other federal questions. Halderman, 673 F.2d 647,
651-56 (3rd Cir. 1982) (en banc). This last decision was the one reviewed in the
case discussed in the accompanying text.
68. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
69. 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
70. The Court reserved this question, see Pennhurst 104 S. Ct. at 910 n.13.
71. See id. at 911.
72. Id.
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The federalist principles it sought to vindicate were not clearly
established, as demonstrated both by Justice Stevens's argument in dissent that the majority tacitly overruled or repudiated at least twenty-eight cases,73 and by the majority's
admission that "there is language in the early cases that advances the [dissent's] authority-stripping theory." 74 Moreover,
two years earlier the Supreme Court itself, in its first consideration of this case, had remanded to the lower court to determine "whether state law provides an independent and adequate
ground which can support the court's remedial order."75 Thus,
whether the Pennhurst decision is ultimately a persuasive interpretation of federalist doctrine or not, it is evidence that, at
least in that context, the Court is deeply committed to protecting the states from intrusion by the federal judiciary.
The cases discussed above, each denying relief for claims of
individual rights, paint a picture of a Court firmly committed to
principles of judicial restraint. Although arguments have been
presented that question the soundness of the decisions, they are
at least consistent in that in each case the Court grounded its
denial of access to the federal courts on constitutional notions.
The following discussion shows how these same justices have
not only ignored these constitutionally based notions of restraint but also have overreached to restrict further individual
rights when the appropriate opportunity was presented.
C.

PRACTICING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
EXPANSION

1.

Rights of Criminal Defendants

PROCEDURAL

In three cases in which appellate courts had reversed convictions for a trial court failure to exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court chose to
reach the substantive fourth amendment question in disregard
of settled principles of justiciability and federalism. 76 In each
case, the result was reinstatement of the conviction, the narrowing of the protection afforded by the fourth amendment in
73. Id- at 943 & n.50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id at 914.
75. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981).
76. The cases discussed in the text are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. For additional cases in which the same group of justices has decided
unnecessary constitutional questions against individual rights in other contexts, see generally Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.
1 (1983).
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future cases, or both.77 This course is doubly disingenuous: if a
restrained court believes prior precedent to have been incorrectly decided, it ought first to await an appropriate case and,
second, to overrule it with a statement of reasons, not whittle
78
away at it.
In United States v. Place,79 the Court went out of its way to
condone the use of trained dogs to detect marijuana in airline
travellers' luggage. Approximately ninety minutes after federal narcotics agents seized defendant Place's luggage at New
York's LaGuardia airport, the luggage was exposed to a narcotics detection dog at Kennedy airport. The dog reacted positively, agents obtained a search warrant for the luggage, and
Place was subsequently convicted on charges of possession of
the cocaine discovered in his luggage.8 0 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
Place's suppression motion, holding that even if arguendo the
initial stop was constitutional, the ninety-minute detention of
Place's baggage transformed it into an unconstitutional
seizure.8 1 The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the
court of appeals that the length of detention of the luggage
alone belied the claim that the seizure was reasonable in the
82
absence of probable cause.
Justice O'Connor, however, writing for a six justice majority, was not content to affirm the reasoning and result of the
Second Circuit. Instead, she gratuitously stated that the expo77. The Burger Court has previously dealt with Warren Court fifth
amendment cases by the same maneuver. See generally Dershowitz & Ely,
Harris v. New York Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1204-08 (1971) (a discussion
of a case in which the Burger Court reached out to consider a Miranda issue
and decided the issue contrary to the weight of authority); Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Cour4 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 106-69 (1977) (discussion
of decisions in which the Burger Court undermined Miranda).
78. Adherents of different judicial philosophies-from the most radical to
the most conservative-have endorsed this limitation on judicial behavior. See,
e.g., Stone, supra note 77, at 168-69 (criticizing Burger Court undermining of
Miranda as poor craftsmanship); Tushnet, supra note 18, at 664 ("Candor re"); cf
quires that the Court overrule cases with which it no longer agrees ..
Wallace, The Jurisprudenceof JudicialRestraint A Return to the Moorings,
50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1981) (suggesting that adherents of judicial restraint should overturn activist decisions only rarely).
79. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
80. Place pleaded guilty after the district court denied his suppression motion, reserving the right to appeal that denial. See United States v. Place, 660
F.2d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1981).
81. See id. at 50-53.
82. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
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sure of luggage to narcotics detection dogs "[does] not consti-

tute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."8 3 Whether the exposure of luggage to trained
dogs is a search was irrelevant to the holding of the case, because it did not occur until after there already had been an unconstitutional seizure. If, as both the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court agreed, taking the luggage from LaGuardia to
Kennedy and detaining it for almost two hours was unlawful,
then any evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful seizure
was fruit of the poisonous tree and therefore inadmissible.8
Because there was no reason for the Court to reach the issue of using dogs to sniff luggage, Place is a classic example of
procedural activism. Further, the effects of this overreaching
already are beginning to have their desired impact. As the
Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. Beale,s
we recognize that [the discussion in Place of the constitutionality of
warrantless exposure of luggage to trained dogs] is dictum and are
aware that the Supreme Court has often remarked that its dicta are
not binding. The Place dictum, however, is so recent and appears to
have been so carefully
considered that we feel obliged to apply it to
86
the case at hand.

The Beale court was perhaps too kind in its characterization of
Place. Although technically dictum, such an excursion into unnecessary issues has more the flavor of an advisory opinion.
The Court simply took a convenient opportunity to give notice
to police, prosecutors, and lower courts that warrantless exposure of luggage to narcotics detection dogs would be upheld.
Although such unnecessary detours may in some cases be justified by weighty considerations, such as a desire to avoid difficult constitutional questions,8 7 no such considerations were
present in Place.8 8
83. I. at 707.
84. For an explanation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 9.3-9.4 (1985). As Judge
James Hill of the Fifth (now Eleventh) Circuit noted in an analogous context:
"Much of what we find it necessary to write in this opinion may be likened
unto deciding whether or not a base runner touched third when it is clear that
he was thrown out at home plate." Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626
F.2d 1238, 1242 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980).
85. 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983).
86. I& at 593 (citations omitted).
87. See, eg., Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 n.4
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting requirement to review potentially dispositive statutory
and local law issues before examining constitutional issues); authorities cited
infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
88. The Court attempted to justify its excursion into the constitutionality
of using dogs without search warrants by arguing that
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In Michigan v. Long8 9 the Court also limited the substantive protection of the fourth amendment against unreasonable
searches in a context that suggests unseemly judicial eagerness
to reach issues prematurely. In Long, the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana because
it found the police search of the defendant's car "was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to-the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." 90 The
Supreme Court reversed on the merits. It held that the protective search of the passenger compartment of an automobile fell
within the ambit of Terry v. Ohio,91 authorizing a limited
92
search on the basis of less than probable cause.
The respondent in Long argued that the Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction because the Michigan decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds. The Court rejected this
jurisdictional argument because "it [was] not clear from the
opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and
independent state ground and ... it fairly appear[ed] that the
state court rested its decision primarily on federal law." 93 The
majority opinion, again authored by Justice O'Connor, reached
The purpose for which respondent's baggage was seized, of
course, was to arrange its exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Obviously, if this investigative procedure is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent's luggage for the purpose
of subjecting it to the sniff test-no matter how brief--could not be
justified on less than probable cause.
Place, 462 U.S. at 706 (citations omitted). This explanation is questionable in
light of the actual facts of the case. The law enforcement officers stopped
Place and seized his luggage not solely for the purpose of subjecting it to a
sniff test, but for the more general purpose of determining whether the luggage contained drugs. In fact, other methods of making this determination existed and were attempted. According to the Supreme Court's account, the
agents first attempted to discover the contents of the luggage by asking Place's
consent to search the luggage, which he refused. Id at 699. The agents then
told Place that they were going to use yet another method to determine the
contents of his luggage: they told him "they were going to take the luggage to
a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant." Id. Thus, the seizure and
detention would not automatically have been unlawful, even if the sniff test
was an unconstitutional search, because the agents might have seized and detained the luggage to search it with consent or with a valid warrant.
89. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
90. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 473, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1982).
91. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
92. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051-52 (1983).
93. Id at 1042 (citation omitted). Long is not the first case in which the
Court chose to reverse a state decision protective of the rights of criminal defendants despite the existence of potentially adequate and independent state
grounds. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726-29 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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this conclusion on the basis of the state court's use of federal

precedent, despite three 94 explicit references to the state constitution. In the future, the majority opinion suggested, any state
court that wishes to cite primarily federal precedent but to rest
its decision additionally on state grounds must "make clear by a
plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal
cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do
'95
not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.
The plain statement is necessary, according to Justice
O'Connor, to ensure that the state court chose its decision
freely, and did not feel compelled by federal precedent to reach
96
the result it did.
The insult to state court justices inherent in Justice
O'Connor's suggestion is obvious: it suggests that state courts
do not recognize their freedom to interpret their own constitutions independent of federal precedent. Such a hypothesis, unlikely in any case, is particularly unpersuasive when, as in
Long, a concurring state court opinion explicitly acknowledged
the disparity between Supreme Court precedent and interpretations by some state courts of their own constitutions.9 7 Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court was well aware that
differences may exist between the state and federal constitutions, having frequently interpreted the Michigan Constitution
more expansively than the federal Constitution. 98
94. Justice O'Connor stated that the state court cited the Michigan constitution only twice. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1036 & n.3 (1983). In fact,
in addition to the passages cited by Justice O'Connor, the state court noted the
general rule under both state and federal constitutions that a warrantless
search or seizure is presumed unreasonable unless it falls within a specific exception. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 472-73 n.8, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870 n.8
(1982). Moreover, Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Mary Coleman, dissenting, cited the Michigan constitutional provision and used a telling plural:
he would have held that the search "did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const., Am. IV; Const.
1963, art. 1, § 11." I& at 473, 320 N.W.2d at 870 (Coleman, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Finally, even the state's brief in the United States Supreme
Court listed the Michigan Constitution, art. 1, § 11 among the "Constitutional
Provisions Involved." Brief for Petitioner at v., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
95. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (1983).
96. i at 1041, 1044.
97. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 482-83 n.4, 320 N.W.2d 866, 874 n.4
(1982) (Moody, J., concurring).
98. Compare, e.g., People v. Cooper, 398 Mich. 450, 459-61, 247 N.W.2d 866,
870 (1976) (double jeopardy precludes retrial by another sovereignty) with
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1959) (trial by different sovereignties
does not violate double jeopardy); compare People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554,
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The decision in Long also seems to ignore the separation of
powers and federalism concerns that counseled restraint in
cases like Allen v. Wright, Los Angeles v. Lyons, and Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman.99 The doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds has long been recognized
as a necessary element of both the article III prohibition
against advisory opinions and the respect due state courts under
principles of federalism. 10 0 Because the Michigan court was
free to reinstate its decision on purely state grounds, the
Supreme Court's decision on the merits was potentially advisory. Moreover, the extent to which the federal government, including the federal judiciary, should interfere with the
operation of state law is a crucial aspect of federalism. 10 1 To
avoid both an advisory opinion and any disrespect to the Michigan court, the Supreme Court ought to have remanded for clarification as to the basis for the lower court's decision. When the
source of the state court's decision is unclear, the Court has
suggested, "it seems consistent with the respect due the highest
courts of states of the Union that they be asked rather than
told what they have intended."'' 0 2 Yet in Long, the Supreme
Court did not ask, but told the Michigan court what it had intended. This disrespect was compounded by the Court's suggestion that the state court was unaware of its choices.
Justice O'Connor appropriately criticized prior law on the
563, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514 (warrantless monitoring of telephone conversation by
participant violates state constitution), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975) with
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1971) (warrantless monitoring of
telephone conversation by participant does not violate federal constitution);
compare People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 22, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1973) (objective test used for entrapment) with United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436
(1973) (subjective test used for entrapment). See also People v. Wallach, 110
Mich. App. 37, 70-71 n.8, 312 N.W.2d 387, 403 (1981) ("Michigan constitutional
law in many ways provides more stringent standards to safeguard the rights of
the individual accused than do our sister states and the federal system.").
99. See supra notes 27-75 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-28 (1945).
101. In cases such as Lyons and Pennhurst,the Court adopts a view of state
law as primary and federal law as interstitial. Under the Long doctrine, however, the Court appears to presume the primacy of federal law, diminishing
the significance of state law. See Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long,
59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1118, 1123-25 (1984). The relative importance of state
and federal law is a crucial question in federalism. Indeed, several authors
have suggested that this question is central to Justice Rehnquist's doctrine of
federalism. See Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14; Powell, supra note 16, at 1331-35.
102. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945).
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doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds as an "ad
hoc method, 10°3 but it is unclear how much plainer a statement
is necessary than those made by the Michigan court. Although
a mere perfunctory recitation by the state court that its decision rests on both state and federal grounds-and that much, at
least, was present in this case-may not indicate very much, a
similar perfunctory statement, in boilerplate language copied
from Justice O'Connor's opinion, that the court is using federal
cases only for "guidance," adds nothing to the substance of the
court's actual basis for decision. 0 4 Instead, Justice O'Connor's
opinion merely changes the obligatory formula. 0 5 That the
103. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
104. With the increasing use of word processing machines, such boilerplate
language could be added to every opinion at the touch of a button. Such language is likely to become as routinely inserted, and thus as virtually meaningless, as the citation in every case in the Supreme Court Reporter to United
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (1906) (Court's syllabus is not part
of the opinion of the Court but is prepared for the reader's convenience). It
has apparently already become so in Mfichigan. See Charter Township of Delta
v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 276-77 n.7, 351 N.W.2d 831, 843 n.7 (1984). The Michigan Supreme Court noted:
For the benefit of the parties to this case and for any future review, we offer the following "plain statement". As should be clear
from our outright rejection of [Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974)], our decision here is based solely on the Due Process
Clause of the Michigan Constitution, art. 1, § 17, notwithstanding the
use of a standard originally developed in the federal system.
Id. For other opinions using similar boilerplate language, see Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 71, 688 P.2d 961, 963 (1984); State v. Binet, 192 Conn. 618, 627
n.9, 473 A.2d 1200, 1205 n.9 (1984); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 722 (Miss.
1984); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 378, 679 P.2d 353, 361 (1984). Oregon has
attempted to finesse the Michiganv. Long presumption by announcing a nunc
pro tunc rule that it is always resting its decision on state grounds. As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 265, 666 P.2d
1316, 1321 (1983), "[1]est there be any doubt about it, when this court cites federal opinions in interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does so because it
finds the views there expressed persuasive, not because it considers itself
bound to do so by its understanding of federal doctrines." Id.
105. There is one other possible justification for Justice O'Connor's insistence on a plain statement. If a state court cites both state and federal law in
an ambiguous manner, the decision is potentially less subject to any review:
the Supreme Court is precluded from review by the adequate and independent
state grounds doctrine, and the people of the state are discouraged from attempting to amend the state constitution to change the state court's result because they may believe the decision to be based primarily on unassailable
federal grounds. See Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor--Judicial Review Under the CaliforniaConstitution, 6 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 975,
996-99 (1979). Even assuming that such an amendment-discouraging effect
could be shown, such a justification implies that the Supreme Court is free to
intervene in the relationships among a state court, the state constitution, and
the people of the state. It is certainly inconsistent with principles of federal-
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Court chose to announce the change in a manner that allowed
it to restrict the scope of the fourth amendment suggests that
law is being made not in an ad hoc fashion, but rather on the
basis of a deliberate, activist agenda: to reduce, whenever possible, the protections afforded criminal defendants.
Moreover, the new doctrine announced in Long is structured so that it creates a consistent opportunity for the Court to
pursue that activist agenda in future cases. The majority adopts
a presumption that where it is not clear from the state court
opinion whether adequate and independent state grounds exist,
such grounds do not exist.10 6 As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the Court has thus adopted a presumption that favors taking jurisdiction rather than the historical presumption against
10 7
taking jurisdiction.
The Court's creation of this presumption not only betrays
the notions of judicial restraint so forcefully urged and applied
by the Court in other cases, but also guarantees that the resulting expansion of Supreme Court jurisdiction will work a very
one-sided change in the law. When the question of adequate
and independent state grounds arises, it arises in one of three
situations. First, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
United States Constitution may accord with the state court's interpretation of the state constitution. In this situation, the
lower court will always be affirmed and a jurisdictional presumption of any sort will not be relevant. A second possibility
is that the Supreme Court could interpret the United States
Constitution to protect individual rights to a greater extent
than the state court interprets the state constitution to do. As
in the first situation, a jurisdictional presumption is irrelevant
because the federal Constitution would override the less protective state constitution regardless of the adequacy of state
grounds supporting the ruling. Only in the third possible situation, in which the state court adopts a broader protection of individual rights under the state constitution than does the
Supreme Court under the federal Constitution, would the presumption in favor of taking jurisdiction have any effect. Thus,
a presumption against the existence of adequate independent
state grounds adds to the Court's jurisdiction in the criminal
procedure context only in those cases in which the Supreme
ism for the Court to engage in such active intervention in state policies in the
absence of any federal constitutional interest.
106. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983).
107. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1986]

ISSUE MANIPULATION

Court is less willing than the state court to protect the rights of

the defendant. 0 8
108. As Justice Stevens noted, the Supreme Court docket recently has
been "swollen with requests by States to reverse judgments that their courts
have rendered in favor of their citizens." Id at 1070 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since Long, the Supreme Court has applied the new adequate and
independent state grounds formulation at least four times in criminal cases,
declining review only once, see Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257, 1257 (1984),
discussed infra note 119. In each of the other cases, the Supreme Court held
that it had jurisdiction and reversed state court decisions which had upheld
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. See Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S.

Ct. 2536, 2543 (1984); Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1853-54 (1984); Oliver
v. United States, 104 S. Ct 1735, 1744 (1984) (reversing lower court decision in
companion case Maine v. Thornton).
There is one context in which the Michigan v. Long formulation might actually work in favor of criminal defendants. The availability of federal habeas
corpus review of a state conviction depends on the state court's treatment of
the defendant's federal constitutional arguments. If the state court rejects
these constitutional claims on the grounds that the defendant failed to comply
with state rules of procedure governing the raising of such claims, federal
habeas review is foreclosed unless the defendant shows cause for failure to
comply with the rules and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional
violations. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977). If the state
court does not rely on a procedural. default, however, but instead rejects the
defendant's constitutional claims on the merits, the cause and prejudice requirements do not apply, and federal review is freely available. See Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979). A difficult question arises,
therefore, when a state court both holds that the defendant forfeited the constitutional claims as a result of a procedural default and also rejects the constitutional claims on the merits. The question is analogous to the adequate
independent state grounds issue addressed in Long: because the state decision
seems to rest on two independent bases, it is not clear whether the state court
rested its decision on grounds that would limit federal review. In Long, the
Court seemed to suggest that any ambiguity in the state court's opinion should
operate to confer federal jurisdiction rather than to limit it. Thus, in the context of the Sykes cause and prejudice standard, which acts to limit the availablilty of federal jurisdiction, the Long presumption in favor of jurisdiction
suggests that if it is unclear on which grounds the state court rested its decision, the cause and prejudice analysis should not be applied. There is, however, a split in the circuits on this question. The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh
circuits hold that habeas review is governed by the Sykes cause and prejudice
standard only if the state court relied exclusively on the procedural default.
See Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1983); Lowery v.
Estelle, 696 F.2d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1983); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1295
n.2 (9th Cir. 1979). The Sixth and Eighth circuits hold that habeas review is
governed by the Sykes cause and prejudice standard if the state court relied
primarily on the procedural default. See Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131-33
(8th Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 112-15 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981). Finally, the Second, Third, and Seventh circuits hold that habeas review is governed by the Sykes cause and prejudice
standard whenever the state court relied on a procedural default. See Phillips
v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 47-51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984);
United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1982);
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Perhaps the most far-reaching illustration of the Court's
recent activism in constricting the rights of criminal defendants
is United States v. Leon.10 9 In that case, the federal district
court had suppressed evidence obtained under a facially valid
search warrant on the ground that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. The warrant in Leon was based on a
police affidavit that recited information obtained from an unidentified confidential informant. At the time the Ninth Circuit invalidated the search warrant, the issue of whether
probable cause could be established on the basis of information
supplied by a confidential informant was governed by the twopronged Aguilar-Spinelli test. Under this test, to establish
probable cause the government had to prove both the informant's veracity and the basis of the informant's knowledge. 110
The court of appeals concluded that the tip in Leon failed both
prongs, and thus that the warrant was invalid. 111 After that deUnited States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 441-43 (3d Cir. 1982).
Only one court of appeals has addressed the relationship between Sykes and
Long. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 50 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1287 (1984). The Phillips court cited Long as an analogous authority and
held the Sykes cause and prejudice standard applicable. Id. at 50. The court
found that any explicit statement by the district judge that he was basing his
decision on a procedural default triggered the Sykes cause and prejudice standard, despite the district judge's alternative holding on the constitutional merits of defendant's claim. Id. at 50-51. This seems inconsistent with the result,
if not the reasoning of Long: in Long, an explicit statement that the court was
basing its decision on state constitutional grounds was insufficient to eliminate
the ambiguity.
In any event, how the Supreme Court resolves this dispute should be
some indication of the Court's commitment to an underlying activist agenda.
If the Court fails to extend its Long presumption of jurisdiction to this analogous context, that will suggest that the Court is in fact motivated primarily by
a desire to curtail the rights of criminal defendants, rather than by a principled view of the appropriate contours of federal jurisdiction. An indication
that the Court will not extend its presumption of jurisdiction to this context
may be found in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). In that
case, the Court conducted a lengthy examination of New York's state procedural rules before concluding that the state decision did not rest on a procedural ground, despite the state court's explicit statement that it was deciding
the case on the merits and despite the absence of any mention of procedural
default in the state court opinion. See id. at 148-52 & nn.8-10. This suggests, as
the Second Circuit has noted, that the Supreme Court thinks federal courts
should carefully avoid entertaining any habeas claims that might rest on independent state procedural grounds. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 50-51
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984).
109. 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
110. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-16 (1964).
111. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3411 (1984).
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cision, but before the grant of certiorari in Leon, the Supreme
Court in Illinois v. Gates112 overruled the Aguilar-Spinellitest,
and substituted an approach that asked whether the tip was reliable under the "totality of the circumstances. ' 1 3
Thus when Leon reached the Supreme Court, the test that
had been used in the lower courts was no longer the correct
test. Prudence and restraint in such cases counsel a remand for
application-by the lower courts in the first instance-of the
correct test. The Court neither remanded for reconsideration
in light of Gates, nor applied the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test. Instead, the Court, at the behest of the government, assumed that the warrant was invalid and reversed the
court of appeals by creating, for the first time, a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule.1 14 Thus in a case that raised
only a straightforward, if recently altered, question of the validity of a search warrant, the Court seized the opportunity to
limit the protection afforded by the fourth amendment and the
exclusionary rule.11 5
Justice White, writing for the majority, justified this jurisdictional overreaching on the ground that the Gates question
112. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
113. See id, at 230.
114. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-23.
115. That the government framed its petition for certiorari to raise the
question whether the exclusionary rule ought to be modified, see id at 3412,
does not require the Court to decide that issue if narrower grounds for a decision exist. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559-60 n.6 (1978); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Moreover, the government's petition asked that the case "be disposed of as appropriate in light of the Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates." Petition for Certiorari at 10, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
In an ironic twist, one state court has utilized similar judicial maneuvering
to avoid the Gates rule. In State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d
136, 143 (1984) (en banc), the Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington Constitution required application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. It is becoming commonplace for state courts to undo the Supreme Court's damage to
defendant's rights by finding such rights in state constitutions. See, e.g., State
v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 264-65, 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984) (en banc); People v.
Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 444, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 814 (1984); People
v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326
(1975); State v. Sidebotham, 124 N.H. 682, 686, 474 A.2d 1377, 1379 (N.H. 1984);
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975); see also Barbash,
State Courts Emerge as Protectors of Individual Rights, Wash. Post, Apr. 16,
1984, at 29, col. 1 (nat'l weekly ed.) (noting that state courts are expanding individual rights and civil liberties at the same time the Supreme Court is limiting them). Jackson is unusual, however, in that the court did not need to
reject the Gates test because the warrant met the requirements of either test.
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 446, 688 P.2d at 144 (Dimmick, J., concurring).
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had "not been briefed or argued. 11 6 The Court's rules, however, allow it to request further briefs on a particular issue. In
fact, in Gates itself the Court had requested special briefing and
a second oral argument to address the specific question of
whether a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule
ought to be created. 117 The Court ultimately declined to decide
that issue in Gates, "with apologies to all" for framing an issue
it chose not to resolve."18 It is ironic that the Court in Leon
chose to ignore a technique that had in fact been exercised, albeit improvidently, in Gates, to reach the question it had been
eager but apparently unable to resolve in Gates." 9
2.

Civil Rights

The federal analogue of Michigan v. Long is City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.120 In both cases, a lower court decision resting on alternative grounds was reversed despite the
undisputed and indisputable validity, or at least unreviewability, of one ground. Further, in both cases the consequence was the limiting of individual rights protected by the
lower court ruling. In Fact Concerts, the plaintiff, a musical
concert promoter, sued the city of Newport, Rhode Island, its
mayor, and six council members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of various constitutional rights. The court
charged the jury, without objection, that it was permitted to
award punitive damages against each defendant "'based on the
116.

See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.

117. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983).
118. See id.
119. There are some members of the Court, moreover, who are not content
simply to expand the Court's jurisdiction whenever possible to deny the rights
of criminal defendants. In Colorado v. Nunez, 104 S. Ct. 1257 (1984) (per
curiam), the Colorado Supreme Court had suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant because the state refused to reveal the identity of the
informant who provided the information on which the warrant was based.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, "it appearing that the judgment of the court below rested on independent and adequate state grounds." Id. at 1257. Despite
their agreement with this holding, Justices White, Burger, and O'Connor felt
compelled to "make clear that neither the Federal Constitution nor any decision of this Court requires the result reached by the Colorado Supreme
Court." Id. (Justice White, concurring, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor). Thus, in a case in which even Michigan v. Long was insufficient to create federal jurisdiction to curtail the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, three Justices issued a purely advisory opinion explaining how
they would have decided the case had it raised a federal question.
120. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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degree of culpability of the individual defendant.' ",121 The jury
found all defendants liable and awarded both compensatory
and punitive damages, including $200,000 in punitive damages
against the city. The city moved for a new trial, contending
that punitive damages may not be awarded against a municipality under section 1983. The district court denied the motion on
the ground that it was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 51.122 The First Circuit affirmed the denial on the
same ground, reasoning that the case did not come within the
plain error exception to Rule 51 because there was insufficient
precedent to make the damage award error, much less plain
12 3
error.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun, reversed on the merits, holding that municipalities
cannot be liable for punitive damages under section 1983.124
The majority dismissed the city's procedural default primarily
on the ground that the legal issue at stake was "novel," "important," and "likely to recur," and that "the interest of justice
warrant[ed] ... plenary consideration."' 125 The Court analogized its exercise of power to ignore Rule 51 to its discretionary
power to decide issues not presented by the parties or not
raised below. 2 6 There is, however, a fundamental difference
between the general doctrine precluding review of issues not
timely raised by the parties and the precise provisions of Rule
121. Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
122. See ici at 253. Rule 51 provides, in relevant part: "[No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." FED. R. Civ. P.
51.
123. See Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir.
1980).
124. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271.
125. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 257 & n.16 (citation omitted). The Court
also relied on the fact that the district court had reached the merits of the punitive damages claim as an alternate holding. Id at 257. As Justice Brennan
noted in dissent, however, lower courts frequently rely on alternate holdings,
but the correctness of one holding pretermits review of the other. See id at
275-76 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See id at 257 n.15. The cases cited to support the Court's decision are
distinguished infra text accompanying notes 129-134. The Court did not cite,
in support of its power to decide issues raised neither in the courts below nor
before the Supreme Court, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981), which was decided the day before
Fact Concerts. Sea Clammers is another example of the Court deciding an unnecessary question in order to restrict the rights of § 1983 plaintiffs and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 137-152.
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51. Rule 51 deals solely with jury instructions, and thus serves
to allow the correction of errors early enough to obviate the necessity of retrial.127 When the jury is not involved, however, an
error by the district court that is corrected at any later stage of
the proceedings will necessitate a remand. Thus Rule 51, unlike the doctrines cited as analogous by the Court in Fact Concerts, conserves judicial resources in addition to ensuring
128
fairness to the parties.
Moreover, the facts of all the cases cited by the Court in
Fact Concerts serve to highlight, not to justify, the jurisdictional
overreaching in Fact Concerts. In both Carlson v. Green 129 and
Youakim v. Miller,130 the opposing party agreed to review of an
issue not raised below. 131 In Fact Concerts, the respondent vigorously contended that Rule 51 precluded review on the merits.132 In both Youakim and Wood v. Georgia, 3 3 the issue
actually reached by the Court was narrower than that raised
below, in both cases avoiding a decision on the merits of an
equal protection claim. 134 In Fact Concerts, the Court's holding
both reached a broad and controversial substantive conclusion
and created an ill-defined and wholly novel exception to Rule
51. The Court's new interpretation of Rule 51, moreover, goes
beyond even the arguments pressed by the petitioner.
Although the city conceded in its brief that the punitive damages question was reviewable only under a plain error standard, 13 5 the Court explicitly refused to limit its review to the
127. See, e.g., Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Corriz
v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 1982); Haywood v. Ball, 586 F.2d 996,
1000 (4th Cir. 1978); General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d
1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Heilman, 563 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.
1977).
128. As Justice Brennan noted, the rule also prevents parties from "making the tactical decision not to object to instructions at trial in order to preserve a ground for appeal," Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 274 (Brennan J.,
dissenting), an interest that is not served by the more general doctrines limiting appellate review.
129. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
130. 425 U.S. 231 (1976).
131. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17 n.2; Youakim, 425 U.S. at 263 n.1.
132. Brief for Respondents at 7-9, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
133. 450 U.S. 261 (1981). It is interesting that Justice White, who joined the
majority in Fact Concerts, dissented in Wood on the ground that the issue decided by the majority had neither been raised below nor suggested in the petition for certiorari. Wood, 450 U.S. at 275-81.
134. See Wood, 450 U.S. at 262-63; Youakim, 425 U.S. at 234.
135. See Brief for Petitioner at 27, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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plain error standard, instead resting on general principles of
138
justice.
The Court, by resolving an issue never raised by the parties, further narrowed the scope of plaintiffs' rights under section 1983 in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Association.1 37 The plaintiff, an organization
whose members harvest fish and shellfish off the coast of New
York and New Jersey, sought to enjoin various federal, state,
county, and city defendants from polluting New York Harbor,
the Hudson River, and the Atlantic Ocean. They relied primar13
ily on the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 8
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA), 39 and the federal common law of nuisance.140 The
district court dismissed the entire suit, holding that neither the
FWPCA nor the MPRSA created a private cause of action and
that a cause of action for nuisance under federal common law is
not available to private parties.1 41 The Third Circuit reversed
as to all three claims. 142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
limited to consideration of three questions:
(i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, (ii) whether all federal common-law nuisance actions concerning ocean pollution now are
preempted by the legislative scheme contained in the FWPCA and
the MPRSA, and (iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing
to
14 3
sue for damages under the federal common law of nuisance.

The Court ultimately held that there was no private cause of
action under either statute, and that federal nuisance law was
fully preempted in the area of ocean pollution.-M
As the Court explicitly recognized, plaintiffs never relied
on section 1983 to support their claims, 145 nor was section 1983
136. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 256-57.
137. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
138. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
139. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1444 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
140. The plaintiffs also based their claims on "§ 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.;... 46 U.S.C. § 740; the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.;" various state statutes; and
several federal constitutional provisions. See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 5 n.6.
None of these claims was considered by the Supreme Court.
141. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 6-8.
142. I. at 8-10. The court of appeals also found a cause of action under
maritime tort law; that claim was not before the Supreme Court. See id at 8.
143. Id at 10-11.
144. See id. at 20-22.
145. Id at 19.
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an issue on which certiorari was granted. Nevertheless, the
Court chose to address whether a section 1983 suit could be
brought for violation of statutory rights created by the FWPCA
or the MPRSA. 146 The Court thus created an artificial opportunity to place limitations on section 1983 suits for violations of
statutory rights. The Court held section 1983 unavailable to redress statutory violations if "Congress ha[s] foreclosed private
enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, [or if] the
statute at issue [is] the kind that [does not create] enforceable
'rights' under § 1983.147 In support of this "foreclosure of private enforcement" prong of the Sea Clammers limitations, Justice Powell cited1 48 only PennhurstState School & Hospital v.
Halderman,'4 9 which in turn relied1 50 solely on Justice Powell's
dissent in the case initially extending section 1983 to statutory
violations, Maine v. Thiboutot.151 By a combination of sleight of
hand and jurisdictional manipulation, the Court thus managed
to adopt a dissenting view in Thiboutot without distinguishing
15 2
or overruling any cases.
In Grove City College v. Bell, 5 3 the Court issued a purely

advisory opinion in order to restrict the reach of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,34 which prohibits gender discrimination in "any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'1 55 Although the case raised only
questions concerning the interpretation of the phrase "Federal
financial assistance," the Court chose to interpret "education
146. Suits under § 1983 for violation of statutory, as well as constitutional,
rights were first allowed in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
147. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19 (citation omitted). The Court did not
reach the second limitation, because it found that Congress had foreclosed a
§ 1983 remedy under the FWCPA and the MPRSA. Id at 19-20.
148. Id at 19.

149. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). This is the first Pennhurst case. See supra note 67.
The second Pennhurstcase is discussed supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
150. Pennhurs4 451 U.S. at 28.
151. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
152. Apparently, no member of the Court in Sea Clammers was disturbed
by either the sleight of hand or the resolution of an unraised issue. Only Justices Stevens and Blackmun declined to join Justice Powell's opinion, and they
dissented on other grounds. Perhaps the pattern of jurisdictional maneuvering
did not become apparent until the later cases.
153. 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
155. Id The statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id,
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program or activity" as well.156 The facts in Grove City College
were straightforward. On the basis of federal grants to Grove
City students, the Department of Education required Grove
City, a private college receiving no direct federal financial
assistance, to execute an assurance of compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of Title IX. This assurance of compliance obligated a recipient of federal funds to
[c]omply, to the extent applicable to it, with Title IX... and all applicable requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Department's
regulation . . . to the end that ... no person shall, on the basis of
sex, be... subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity for which [it] receives157or benefits from Federal financial
assistance from the Department.

When Grove City refused to execute the assurance on the
ground that federal aid to students did not constitute "Federal
financial assistance" within the meaning of Title IX, the Department obtained a ruling by an administrative law judge that
Grove City students were ineligible for federal grants until
Grove City executed the assurance of compliance. Grove City
and four of its students then brought suit in federal court to
challenge the Department's order terminating the grants. The
district court ruled for the college, 158 the Third Circuit reversed,1 59 and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's holding requiring Grove City to execute the assurance
160
or face termination of funding.
The only question necessary to the resolution of the case
was whether Grove City was correct in asserting that the student grants did not constitute "Federal financial assistance"
under the statute. 161 The Court canvassed the legislative his156. See Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1225 (Stevens, J., concurring).
157. HEW Form 639A, quoted in Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1215 (citing Appeal to Petition for Cert. 126-27).
158. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The
district court agreed with the Department that the student grants constituted
federal financial assistance under Title IX, but concluded that grants to students could not be terminated merely because of the College's refusal to execute an assurance of compliance, unless actual sex discrimination could be
shown. See id. at 270.
159. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
160. See Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1223.
161. The court of appeals had interpreted "education program" in Title IX
to include the entire institution that benefited from the financial assistance,
and not just the particular narrow program directly receiving federal assistance, in this case, the student financial aid program. See Grove City College,
687 F.2d at 696-701. It did so, however, only in response to Grove City's argument that the "program-specific" provisions of Title IX were inconsistent with
including student aid within the definition of "Federal financial assistance."
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tory and concluded that Title IX did extend to student grants,
and thus that Grove City was required to execute the assurance
of compliance in order for its students to remain eligible for the
grants. 162 The assurance obligated Grove City to comply with
Title IX only "to the extent applicable to it." Thus, the Court's
ruling on the grant question left open the exact contours of the
discrimination proscribed by Title IX, insofar as the language of
the assurance of compliance was congruent with any interpretation of Title IX.
Because Grove City did not allege that it wished to discriminate on the basis of gender-and in fact maintained throughout the litigation that it did not discriminate, had never
discriminated, and did not wish to discriminate, but only that it
objected to the federal paternalism underlying the assurance of
compliance' 6 3L-there was no need to define the precise contours of Title IX. Had Grove City alleged that it wished to discriminate in, for example, its athletic program, the Court would
have been presented with the question of whether the phrase
"education program or activity" extended only to the direct recipient, or rather extended to any program that might indirectly benefit from the federal funds. Despite the lack of any
allegations that Grove City wished to discriminate in any of its
programs, and despite the position of the Secretary of Education that execution of the assurance did not proscribe discrimination in other programs of the college, 164 the majority reached
the issue of program specificity and limited the scope of Title
IX to the narrowest "program" receiving federal aid: it held
that the financial aid program was the only program receiving
federal financial assistance and thus was the only program subject to Title IX.165
Id at 700 n.28. The court of appeals rejected this argument by concluding that

the "program" benefited by federal grants to students was the whole university; the Supreme Court instead rejected the same argument by finding a legislative intent to include student grants within the scope of Title IX regardless
of any seemingly inconsistent language in the statute. See Grove City College,
104 S. Ct. at 1220.
162. See Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1220-23.
163. See, e.g., id. at 1223-24 (Powell, J., concurring); Grove City College, 687
F.2d at 701 n.29; Grove City College, 500 F. Supp. at 259; Petition for Certiorari
at 3, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
164. See Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1220 n.20; see also Brief for Respondents at 16, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984) (conceding
that Title IX applies only to Grove City's financial aid program).
165. See Grove City College, 104 S.Ct. at 1222-23. Justice Stevens thought
the program-specificity discussion to be "an advisory opinion unnecessary to
[the] decision," and refused to join that part of the majority opinion. Id. at
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Grove City College thus stands as another striking example
of the Court's willingness to disregard the constitutionally
grounded notions of judicial restraint it expounds in different
contexts. The pattern that emerges from this selective restraint and activism is clear: the Court relies on principles of
federalism, separation of powers, and article III "case or controversy" requirements to deny relief to rights-seeking plaintiffs,
but disregards these same principles when by doing so it can
further restrict the scope of constitutional and statutory
rights. 166 Perhaps it is unfair to criticize the Court for this inconsistency. For what emerges from this pattern of selective
activism and restraint is another, deeper pattern whose ele1225-26. The majority's only response was to suggest that the existence of a
binding court of appeals opinion that the entire college constituted the "program," see supra note 161, entitled Grove City to a ruling on the contours of
Title IX. See Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1220 n.20. A more satisfactory
response to the problem would have been to vacate the court of appeals's decision on the merits of the program specificity question as advisory, rather than
to issue an equally advisory opinion reversing the decision. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2591 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). Respondents and one of the judges below recognized that the Third Circuit's discussion of program specificity constituted nonbinding dicta. See Grove City
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1982); Brief for the United States
in Opposition at 4, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
The dissent argued persuasively that Congress did not intend the "program-specific" interpretation reached by the Court, see Grove City College, 104
S. Ct. at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the immediate introduction
of several bills to reverse the Court's interpretation, see H.R. 5011, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984) (introduced Mar. 1, 1984); S. 2363, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(introduced Feb. 28, 1984), suggests that the dissent was correct. The Court's
interpretation at least arguably allows institutions to circumvent the antidiscrimination purpose of Title IX by supporting a particular program with funds
from other programs, replacing the diverted funds with federal aid. Thus,
whether or not the Court's interpretation of Title IX is correct, it undeniably
significantly narrows the protection afforded against gender-based discrimination. See generally Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell: Touchdown or
Touchback?, 43 MD. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1984) (arguing that institution-wide
enforcement is needed to eliminate discrimination in athletic programs and
specific university departments because few such programs receive federal
funds earmarked for their use).
166. In at least one case, the Court has combined notions of restraint with
procedural activism to restrict the scope of a statutory right. As discussed
supra text accompanying notes 51-65, in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983) the Court bolstered its conclusion that equitable relief was unavailable
to the plaintiff by stating that federalism concerns "counselled] restraint"
agaimst granting such relief. See id. at 112. Because the Court had already
concluded that the plaintiff did not have standing to assert the claim, and because the availability of equitable relief was not an issue raised in the petition,
the Court should never have even addressed the issue. See supra notes 61-65
and accompanying text.
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ments are indeed consistent-a pattern of subordinating the
rights of the individual to the perceived interests of the
majority.
II. COMMUNITY AND CONSENSUS
Although the pattern of the Court's selective restraint and
activism is clear, the underlying causes of this shift in emphasis
from protecting individual rights to protecting majority rule are
not. The explanation most commonly offered for the Court's
current posture is one of simple conservatism, 167 but the pattern of decisions may reveal a deeper focus. In particular, it is
difficult to explain the decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,168 discussed in detail below, 169 with a theory that explains the Court's approach by reference to substantive political
conservative values.
An alternative, and perhaps more satisfactory explanation
of the Court's procedural aggressive majoritarianism is that it
stems from a newfound emphasis on community consensus
rather than belief in individual autonomy. One of the values
that favoring majority interests may serve is increased cohesiveness in the community unit, at least if that unit is defined
to include only members of the majority. The more often
members of the majority are permitted to translate their
desires into law, unfettered by constitutional or other constraints, the more democratic and unified they will perceive
their society to be. Decisions made by the polity are perceived
to be the result of general consensus, because, by definition, excluded minorities do not count. 70 A lack of judicial interference, or a judicial stamp of approval, 171 fosters this sense of
167. See, e.g., Dorsen & Gora, Free Speech, Property and the Burger Court
Old Values, New Balances, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 195, 202-03; Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58-60 (1984);
see also Shapiro, supra note 12, at 307-28 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's conservative ideological commitments).
168. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
169. See infra notes 176-188 and accompanying text.
170. The Court's present insensitivity to minority rights is primarily cen-

tered on the rights of "discrete and insular" minorities, who are by definition
outside the political mainstream. See United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J. ELY, supra note 4, at 135-79; Sherry, supra note
3, at 103-05. As one commentator has noted, minorities are "not ... voiceless
but friendless, not politically invisible but politically unmarriageable." Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:A Constitutionaland Empirical Analysis,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 315 (1972).
171. See Bickel, The Supreme Cour 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 48-51 (1961).
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government by consensus. Moreover, the protection of individ-

ual rights against the will of the majority has the opposite effect, in two distinct aspects. A legal infrastructure grounded on
individual rights encourages citizens to think of themselves
more as autonomous individuals than as members of the community. As the judiciary begins protecting individual rights to
a lesser degree, that infrastructure may begin to dissolve into
one grounded more on values of community and connection
than on values of autonomy and independence. Further, it is
plausible to argue that protecting individual rights has the effect of splintering society, of making members of the majority
feel that they are not part of a cohesive community but simply
individuals competing with other individuals for whatever
benefits the society has to offer. It is thus possible that the
Court's shift towards majoritarianism is in fact grounded in a
vision of democracy as communitarian or unified, rather than
172
adversarial.
The Court's jurisdiction-defining approach to majoritarianism-the procedural majoritarianism described above' 73 -- supports the view that the new aggressive majoritarianism may
stem not from simple conservative politics, but rather from a
shift in emphasis from the individual to the community. The
effect of the cases described above is to lessen individual access
to the courts substantially, while increasing the access of those
seeking to protect community interests that may have been
overlooked or undervalued by the legislature. The Court is
thus transforming the judiciary from a countermajoritarian
branch dedicated to promoting and protecting individuals into a
countermajoritarian branch dedicated to promoting community
interests. Just as the Warren Court intervened when it believed that the legislature failed sufficiently to protect minority
rights, this Court intervenes when it believes that the legislature has failed sufficiently to protect community interests. 7 4
172. See generally J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 8-22
(1980) (describing the concept of unitary democracy). Professor Cass Sunstein
has suggested that the preference for community benefit over individual rights
has its roots in the framers' notion of "civic virtue," and is in fact a unifying
theme of the Constitution. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1689, 1691 (1984). For a refutation of this historical
premise, see Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication (forthcoming, 72 VA. L. REv. - (Apr. 1986)).
173. See supra notes 76-166 and accompanying text.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 221-233. Four members of the
Court's conservative bloc may have begun very recently to articulate such a
communitarian process theory. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
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The greater descriptive power of the communitarian model
over the conservative model is illustrated by a number of recent decisions. These cases seem to be protecting group or community interests at the expense of traditional individual
property rights, and may confirm that the procedural manipulation described above is informed by an emphasis on community rather than conservatism. Although this section focuses
only on isolated cases, even the existence of such cases is a relatively new
phenomenon,
suggesting
some kind
of
transformation. 7 5
One of the most puzzling cases to explain with a conservative model is the Court's recent decision in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.176 The legislature of Hawaii, in order to
break up a pattern of concentrated land ownership that was a
virtual oligopoly, enacted legislation that required unconsenting
landowners to sell to their tenants if certain specified condi77
tions were met. After the district court upheld the statute,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that taking land from one
individual for the private use and benefit of another individual
could not constitute a public purpose. 7 8 The court of appeals
thus held that the taking-even if adequately compensated-violated the fifth amendment's public use clause' 79 as "a naked
attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), the Court reduced the tenth amendment to its
former status as a "truism," largely on the theory that the states are sufficiently protected by the political process. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, in dissent, drew the analogy
between protection of individuals and protection of state interests, stating:
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress
is composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights are amply protected by the political process. Yet the position
adopted today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an essential part of the Bill of Rights.
I&rat 1025 n.8 (Powell, J., 4issenting). Justice Powell also suggested that congressional unresponsiveness to state concerns may be the result of its overconcern with the rights of interest groups or individual constituents. See id. at
1025 n.9.
175. The cases also involve shifting configurations of justices. The core majority that forms the focus of Part I of this Article is not as cohesively influential in Part II, but the wavering views of individual justices are still an
interesting indication of the direction of the Court.
176. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
177. Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 70 (D. Hawaii 1979).
178. See Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983).
179. The public use clause provides that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use without just compensation," see U.S. CONsT. amend. V,
cl.4, and is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See
Midkiff 104 S. Ct. at 2327.
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property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and
benefit."'1- 0 A purer judicial embodiment of a politically conservative approach to land ownership is hard to imagine. Nevertheless, in a brief unanimous opinion authored by Justice
18 1
O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court held that the forced sale to tenants was a rational, constitutional solution to the problems posed by concentrated land ownership, and that breaking up the oligopoly of
ownership was a permissible legislative purpose. The sole purpose and effect of the legislation was an alteration only in the
ownership, and not in the use, of the land. 8 2 By thus construing "public purpose" to include intervention designed solely to
achieve broader land ownership, the Court essentially approved
legislative redistribution of wealth. 83 The decision is thus an
example inconsistent with various descriptions of the Court as
conservative. For example, the Court's approval of land redistribution is contrary to the philosophy of the conservativebased Chicago School of economics, a primary tenet of which is
that only efficiency, and not distributional goals, justifies legislative intervention in the market system. 84 Further, by legiti180. Midkiff, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983).
181. See Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2327.
182. Midkiff is therefore distinguishable from Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954), the condemnation case on which Justice O'Connor primarily relied.
In Berman, the property was taken for a redevelopment project designed to
renovate completely an entire section of the city. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
In Midkiff, however, the disputed property will remain residential and largely
unchanged; only title changes. Midkiff 104 S. Ct. at 2325, 2331.
183. Because the landowners did not wish to sell, even the requirement of
just compensation did not ensure that wealth would not be redistributed. By
definition, the landowners valued their land more highly than the price at
which they would be forced to sell, or else it would not be a nonconsensual
taking. The fifth amendment anticipates that landowners will have to suffer
that loss for the good of the public; the question in Midkiff was whether land
redistribution in and of itself constitutes a permissible public purpose.
184. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 405-07 (1978); H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 2.1-.2, at 40-45 (1985); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
110-12 (1977); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 925-33 (1979); cf Epstein, Toward A Revitalization of the Contract
Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 703-05 (1984) (advocating minimal intervention
in market economies). Judge Frank Easterbrook has recently suggested that
the Court might in fact be moving toward adoption of these conservative economic principles. See Easterbrook, supra note 167, at 4-5.

Using conservative economic principles alone, the case is also difficult to
reconcile with the trend in the antitrust field toward less interference with the
market and more tolerance of oligopolies. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (upholding manufacturer's restrictive location agreements); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551,
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mating the legislature's conclusion that land oligopoly is an evil
in itself, the Court weakened any suggestion that it is committed primarily to protecting property rights. 18 5 The decision is
also inconsistent with suggestions that the Court is basically
libertarian, 8 6 because the case involved active legislative interference with the landowners' decision not to sell.
From an individual rights perspective, the decision seems,
inexplicably, to create a right to purchase someone else's land.
The result is more easily explained, however, under the communitarian model. The legislature, and the Court, chose to protect the interest of the community rather than the rights of
individuals. Justice O'Connor suggested that concentrated land
ownership was detrimental to the community itself: "concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's
residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare."' 8 7 Viewed as a choice
between protecting the rights of landowners and protecting the
rights of potential purchasers, the decision may be characterized as politically liberal, or even radical. Viewed as a choice
between protecting individual rights and protecting community
interests, the decision is communitarian-and political labels
88
are not easily applied.'
Another illustration of the explanatory power of the communitarian model is the odd juxtaposition of two cases involving article I courts: Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.,' 8 9 which held bankruptcy courts un1569-76 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist) (holding that medical specialists association's
exclusive contracts with hospitals were not per se tying arrangements).
185. For articles suggesting that the Court is primarily committed to protecting property rights, see, e.g., Dorsen & Gora, supra note 167, at 1202-03;
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 322-28. But see Nagel, On ComplainingAbout the
Burger Court, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2068, 2074-75 & n.16 (1984). It is not simply
that other interests are allowed to override property rights; the constitutional
value of property ownership itself is questioned. It is as if the Warren Court
had said that speech might be restricted because too much speech is itself an
evil.
186. See, e.g., Nowak, Foreword: Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court4 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263 (1980).
187. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1984).
188. The suggestion that the decision is the result of a deferential approach
to legislative decision making, see, e.g., Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98
HARV. L. REV. 87, 231-32 (1984), cannot be squared with the cases discussed
supra notes 76-166 and accompanying text. The burden of this Article has
been to show that it is disingenuous for the Court to suggest that it is merely
adopting the deferential stance required by principles of judicial restraint.
189. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
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constitutional, and the more recent Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co.,1 90 which upheld a delegation of judicial authority to federal mediators. In NorthernPipeline, the
Court invalidated the jurisdiction provision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978,191 which assigned the whole of federal judicial authority over bankruptcy to judges who did not possess the article III protections of lifetime tenure and undiminishable salary.
Northern Pipeline had filed for bankruptcy under the Act in a
bankruptcy court. Under the Act, that court then had jurisdiction over all other lawsuits involving Northern Pipeline, and
the company accordingly filed its state breach of contract claim
against Marathon in the bankruptcy court. Marathon sought,
and was granted, dismissal of the suit on the ground that the
Act unconstitutionally conferred article III jurisdiction on
nonarticle III judges. The Supreme Court, on direct appeal,
192
affirmed.
The plurality, composed of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, surveyed the complicated and inconsistent precedent on article I courts, and concluded that such
courts may be given article III jurisdiction only in three limited
circumstances, each defined by "historical consensus." 93 The
first exception to the general prohibition on article I courts is
the courts of the territories and of the District of Columbia,
when Congress is exercising powers analogous to those of state
legislatures. 1 94 The second exception is courts martial, because
the constitutional provisions involving the military have "been
historically understood as giving the95political branches of the
1
Government extraordinary control.

The most important exception involves administrative
agency adjudication of "public rights." Public rights, although
not well defined, are rights created by the legislature that give
rise to disputes that might have been resolved wholly legislatively. 19 6 Thus, such disputes are not "inherently judicial" and
may be resolved by the judiciary, the legislature, or an executive or legislative agency such as an article I court, at Con190.

105 S.Ct. 3325 (1985).

191.

28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1980).

192. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57, 87.
193. See icdat 70.

194. Id at 64-65.
195. Id at 66.
196. Id. at 67-70; see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 585 F.
Supp. 713, 724-25 (E.D. Pa.1983).
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gress's option.1 97 The plurality rescued the "public rights"
doctrine from near obscurity, citing primarily cases decided between 1855 and 1932.198 Relying on the statement that "the
presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient" condition for a dispute to
involve public rights, 19 9 Justice Brennan concluded that a state
law contract dispute between the debtor and a third party did
not fall within the public rights exception to the ban on article
I courts.200 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the
judgment, finding only that article I courts were precluded
from deciding such state law claims as were "the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1798."201
Three years later, the Court unanimously reached the opposite conclusion in an almost indistinguishable case. The
20 2
Court in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgriculturalProducts Co.
upheld a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)20 3 that allowed federal mediators to
make virtually unreviewable determinations in compensation
disputes between two private parties. Under FIFRA, as a precondition for registration of a pesticide, manufacturers must
submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency
concerning the product's health, safety and environmental effects. Because much of this data is duplicative, Congress had
experimented with various mandatory data-sharing schemes,
requiring original submitters of data to allow their data to be
used by later, or "follow-on" registrants. A major problem with
some of the earlier schemes was that the EPA's responsibility
for cataloging the data in terms of whether it constituted protected, undisclosable trade secrets, and the resulting litigation
over what constituted trade secrets, bogged down the registration process and ultimately stopped any new pesticide registrations. Congress thus amended FIFRA in 1978,204 redefining the
statute's trade secret exemption so that it did not include most
of the submitted data, but requiring "follow-on" registrants to
197. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 69 n.23.
200. See id at 71.
201. Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
202. 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).
203. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
204. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
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obtain permission from the original submitters and to compensate the original submitters for the use of the data.20 5 The challenged portion of the 1978 amendments to FIFRA involved the
procedure by which the terms of such compensation were to be
set. Section 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) of the Act requires the original submitter and the follow-on registrant to negotiate. If no agreement can be reached, the dispute is submitted to binding
arbitration, which is reversible by a court only for fraud, mis20 6
representation, or other misconduct.
This delegation of virtually unreviewable judicial power to
a mediator who does not possess the article III salary and tenure protections, and who is clearly subject to a good deal of
political control, would seem to be unconstitutional under
Northern Pipeline. The Court already had held that the property interest in trade secrets arises under state law,20 7 and thus
the underlying claim in a FIFRA case is essentially a traditional state law claim for compensation for misappropriation of
property. Under the Northern Pipeline plurality's definition,
such a claim is inappropriate for article I court resolution because it does not involve the government as a party; under the
approach of the concurrence, it is similarly inappropriate for article I court resolution because it is a traditional state law prop20 8
erty rights dispute.
Instead, in largely unconvincing opinions by Justice
O'Connor for the Court and Justice Brennan for himself and
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, the Court distinguished
205. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982).
206. Id. The mediation portion of the statute provides in relevant part:
The terms and amount of compensation may be fixed by agreement
between the original data submitter and the applicant, or, failing such
an agreement, binding arbitration under this subparagraph. If, at the
end of ninety days after the date of delivery to the original data submitter of the offer to compensate, the original data submitter and the
applicant have neither agreed on the amount and terms of compensation nor on a procedure for reaching an agreement on the amount and
terms of compensation, either person may initiate binding arbitration
proceedings by requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service to appoint an arbitrator from the roster of arbitrators maintained by such Service.... [T]he findings and determination of the

arbitrator shall be final and conclusive, and no official or court of the
United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
findings and determination, except for fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct by one of the parties to the arbitration or the
arbitrator.

Id207.
208.

See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984).
See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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Northern Pipeline and upheld the statute. Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion held that the original submitter's property interest in the data as a trade secret arises under FIFRA itself,
not under state law.20 9 In light of Monsanto's explicit holding
to the contrary,21 0 this is untenable. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Thomas circumvented, by the judicious use of an ellipsis, his earlier statement in Northern Pipeline suggesting that
the government's presence as a party is a necessary condition
for any dispute to be considered within the public rights exception. In Thomas he noted that Northern Pipeline "made clear
that 'the presence of the United States as a proper party to the
proceeding is ... not [a] sufficient means of distinguishing
"private rights" from "public rights." ' "211 Despite tortured attempts by both Justices O'Connor and Brennan, the cases are
virtually irreconcilable.
There is, however, one significant difference between the
two cases. Although the statutes in each case involved dilution
of judicial protection of individual property rights, only in
Thomas was that dilution justified by community interests:
health, safety, and environmental concerns. In Northern Pipeline, however, the only countervailing interest was some version of judicial efficiency. Although such a fine distinction
admittedly does not lend overwhelming support to the communitarian model, it is nonetheless illuminating. Thomas and
Northern Pipeline can be explained under the model as the
handiwork of a transitional Court: although it is still concerned
with protecting individual rights to some 'extent, the Court is
209.

See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325,

3335 (1985).
210. In Monsanto, the Court stated that
we are mindful of the basic axiom that "'[p]roperty interests ... are
not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law.' .
We therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data cognizable as a tradesecret property right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 2872-74 (citation and footnote omitted).
211. Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3343 (Brennan, J., concurring) (all omissions and
additions by Brennan, J.). Justice Brennan had actually stated in Northern
Pipeline that "[it is thus clear that the presence of the United States as a
proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public rights."' Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at 69 n.23 (emphasis added).
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willing to allow such rights to be subordinated to the interests
of the community at large.
The Court's unusual approach to the problem of illegal
alien children in Plyler v. Doe21 2 also appears to indicate that
community plays an increasingly important role in the Court's
analyses. In Plyler, the State of Texas denied "undocumented"
children-those who were in this country illegally-any access
to the free public education it offered all other children. The
Court, by a narrow majority, held that the Texas scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. 213 Ordinary equal protection
analysis might suggest that the disadvantaged children constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and thus that the Court
21 4
should subject the scheme to strict or quasi-strict scrutiny.
Such an approach would be consistent with a high regard for
individual rights, requiring an extraordinary community interest to overcome the detrimental effect on the individual children. The majority in Plyler, however, refused to adopt that
approach.2 15 Instead, the Court applied a rational basis test, a
low level of review appropriate for cases involving neither a
suspect class nor a fundamental right, and still found the statute defective. 216 The flaw in the Texas scheme, according to
the Court, was in its failure to allow the children to develop the
skills necessary to become full, functioning members of the
community. Justice Brennan stated that
"as. . .pointed out early in our history,... some degree of education
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence."... In addition, education provides the basic tools by

which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social
costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests....
. . . "[E]ducation prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self217
sufficient participants in society."

Thus the Court chose to invalidate the statute not primarily as
212. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
213. See Plyler,457 U.S. at 215.
214. See generally Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Product, 98 HARV. L. REV.
713, 737-40 (1985) (describing how courts might undertake "legislative mind
reading" to identify prejudices entitling a discrete and insular group to constitutional protection); Sherry, supra note 3, at 108-14 (examining reasons for
heightened scrutiny).
215. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
216. Id. at 223-30.
217. Id at 221-22 (citations omitted).
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a deprivation of an ordinary individual right not to be discriminated against, but rather as a deprivation of an individual's
right to be a functioning member of a community.2 1 8 This is in
stark contrast to the earlier line of cases declaring alienage status to be a suspect classification, 2 19 which are much closer to a
220
standard individual rights analysis.
In some cases, the Court's concern with community interests is even greater than that objectively evinced by the community itself. When the Court takes a narrow reading of
statutes enacted for the benefit of the politically disadvantaged,
it engages in a sort of "supermajoritarianism" that goes beyond
the expressed community interest in order to save the majority
from its own excesses. For example, when Congress enacted
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,221 arguably it
did not intend to limit the statute's reach to the specific educational program receiving federal aid, 222 yet that is the result the

Court reached in Grove City College.223 Similarly, in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman,224 by refusing to entertain the plaintiff's undisputed claim of institutional violations,
the Court denied to the mentally handicapped the protection
afforded them by a majority of Pennsylvanians. 225
218. For further elaboration of the distinction between ordinary individual
rights and individual rights to membership in a community, see Sherry, supra
note 172.
219. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
220. Another indication of the Court's emphasis on community interests
rather than individual rights is the method by which Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority in Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984), distinguished Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997, affg mer. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.
1971). Plaintiffs in both cases raised similar challenges to IRS procedures, but
the Coit plaintiffs were black residents of a single community and the Wright
plaintiffs were a nationwide group of parents of black schoolchildren. Justice
O'Connor distinguished Coit, which had upheld plaintiff's standing, partly on
that ground. Such a distinction, which the dissent characterized as novel,
might suggest that where individual rights are intricately bound up with a cohesive community, the Court is more willing to grant standing.
221. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982)).
222. See supra note 165.
223. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984). For a more detailed discussion of Grove City
College, see supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
224. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
225. For a more detailed discussion of Pennhurst,see supra notes 66-75 and
accompanying text. An argument can be made that Pennhurst is not a
supermajoritarian decision because the Court did not hold that the plaintiffs
were entitled to no relief, but held only that they were not entitled to relief in
federal court. Such an argument misses the thrust of this Article. The focus
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The Court's decision in Michigan v. Long 226 is a more sub-

tle example of the Court's aggressive majoritarianism. Overruling a state court's reversal of a conviction is supermajoritarian
in two ways. State court judges are often elected, and are
drawn from backgrounds almost as diverse as those of state legislators.2 27 Thus, by overruling the decision of an electorally accountable branch of the state government, the Supreme Court
is substituting its own perception of majority interests for the
expressed will of the majority. Moreover, by adopting a presumption that ambiguous state court decisions rest on federal
grounds, the Supreme Court ensures that future majority
desires will be more easily translated into action: forcing the
state court to commit itself to state grounds allows state citizens to identify the source of the decision and thus to change it
228
by amending the state constitution.
The motivation behind the Court's apparent desire to save
the majority from itself in cases like Grove City College and
Pennhurst may be a communitarian version of the United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 229 concept of lack of access to

the legislature. Under such a view, legislators, motivated politically to advance the interests of the most vocal segments of
their constituency, inevitably undervalue the interest of the
community as a whole. Thus the Court is merely compensating
for the anticommunity bias inherent in a scheme in which legislative decisions are influenced by lobbyists and pressure groups.
Professor Bruce Ackerman's insightful critique 230 of the
theoretical underpinnings of the Carolene Products Court's focus on "discrete and insular" minorities, although leading to a
different result,231 touches on some of the same concerns. Arhere is on the United States Supreme Court's aggressive majoritarianism and
the Court's unwillingness to let federal courts assume the role of vindicators
of individual rights. Although the state courts can, and in many cases will, effectively perform this function, it is no answer to say that the federal courts
are thereby relieved of their duty in the same regard.
226. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). For a discussion of Long, see supra notes 89-108
and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 4, at 4 n. 17; Flango & Ducat, What
Difference Does Method of JudicialSelection Make? Selection Procedures In
State Courts of Last Resor 5 JusT. SYS. J. 25, 30-33 (1979); Kagan, Infelise &
Detlefsen, American State Supreme Court Justices 1900-1970, 1984 Am. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 371 (1984). The Michigan Supreme Court, whose decision
was reversed in Long, is indeed elected. See Flango & Ducat, supra, at 29.
228. See supra note 105.
229. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
230. See Ackerman, supra note 214, at 713.
231. To be sure, Professor Ackerman's analysis does not lead to an en-
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guing for a "doctrinal reorientation 2 32 of the Carolene Products Court's concern for the fairness of the pluralist process,
Professor Ackerman contends that
[e]ven when considered as an exercise in symptomatology, Carolene is
utterly wrongheaded in its diagnosis. Other things being equal, "discreteness and insularity" will normally be a source of enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist
American politics. Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene emphasizes-groups that
are "anonymous and diffuse" rather than "discrete and insular." It is
these groups that both political science and American history
indicate
233
are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.

If indeed anonymity and diffuseness work to a group's disadvantage, it is hard to think of a group more disadvantaged than
the total community. The Court may be reacting to related
concerns when it pursues supermajoritarianism.
CONCLUSION
Members of the dominant faction of the current Supreme
Court are apparently trying to have their cake and eat it, too.
In some contexts, the Court uses constitutionally grounded notions of judicial restraint to deny rights-seeking plaintiffs access
to the federal courts, while at other times the Court disregards
these same notions and reaches out to decide unnecessary issues to restrict further individual rights. This Article has attempted to expose the Court's underlying agenda by examining
the implications of these inconsistent lines of precedent. That
agenda appears to be twofold: to change the Constitution from
a
document
balanced
between
majoritarian
and
countermajoritarian premises to one that is primarily
dorsement of the aggressive majoritarianism now being practiced by the Court.
Rather, he recognizes the relative disadvantage suffered by members of minority groups and remains true to CaroleneProducts's underlying concern for the
fairness of pluralist politics. It is with Carolene Products's focus on discreteness and insularity that Ackerman takes issue. See id. at 745 ("We must repudiate the bad political science that allows us to ignore those citizens who have
the most serious complaints: the anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty
and sexual discrimination who find it most difficult to protect their fundamental interests through effective political organization.").
232. See id. at 718.
233. Id. at 723-24; accord, Macey, Special Interest Groups and Statutory Interpretation,(forthcoming, 86 COLUM. L. REV. - (Mdr. 1986)) (using economic
analysis to support thesis that small organized interest groups are more successful at obtaining enactment of legislation).
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majoritarian, and to transform the role of the Court from the
guardian of individual rights to the guardian of majority rule.
This Article has also suggested one possible philosophical
explanation for this doctrinal shift: it may reflect a move away
from a jurisprudence of individual rights and toward a more
communitarian theory of law. This communitarian theory is
particularly apparent in those cases in which the Court limits
individual rights created by the majority for the minority's benefit. In these situations, the Court may be acting to compensate
perceived weaknesses in the legislative process; insulated from
political pressures, the Court can insure that the silent majority
is given a voice, albeit in court rather than in the legislature.
Given that community-influenced decisions are a relatively recent phenomenon, there may be some dispute about whether
this theory is adequate to explain the doctrinal shift. There
should be dispute about whether the theory is adequate to justify it.

